Socratic Misogyny?--Analyzing Feminist Criticisms of Socratic Teaching in Legal Education by Garner, David D.
BYU Law Review
Volume 2000 | Issue 4 Article 7
11-1-2000
Socratic Misogyny?--Analyzing Feminist
Criticisms of Socratic Teaching in Legal Education
David D. Garner
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law and Gender Commons, Legal Education Commons, and the Women's Studies
Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
David D. Garner, Socratic Misogyny?--Analyzing Feminist Criticisms of Socratic Teaching in Legal Education, 2000 BYU L. Rev. 1597
(2000).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2000/iss4/7
7GAR-FIN.DOC 12/9/00 1:41 PM 
 
1597 
Socratic Misogyny?—Analyzing Feminist Criticisms of 
Socratic Teaching in Legal Education 
Remember those horror movies in which somebody wearing a hockey 
mask terrorizes people at a summer camp and slowly and carefully 
slashes them all into bloody little pieces? That’s what the first year of 
law school is like. 
. . . 
The professor has a black belt in an ancient martial art called “the So-
cratic method.” After the professor completely dismantles a student for 
sheer sport and humiliates several dozen others, he then points out 
forty-seven different things in the two-paragraph case that you failed 
to see and still don’t understand. 
 . . . 
[Many students] spend most of their time wondering what  
the hey is going on, and why don’t the professors just tell us 
what the law is and stop playing “hide the ball” and  
shrouding the law in mystery/philosophy/sociology/nihilistic relativism 
/astrology/voodoo/sado-masochistic Socratic kung fu?1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
If legal education were known for nothing else, its pedagogical 
claim to fame would undoubtedly be the widespread use of a unique 
method of classroom instruction bearing the cryptic moniker: “The 
Socratic Method” (or, if you prefer, “Socratic kung fu”). The So-
cratic method is so entrenched in modern American legal pedagogy 
that a law school just isn’t a law school without the Socratic 
method.2 As the above tongue-in-cheek caricature attests, the popu-
larity of the Socratic method in legal education has made it the sub-
ject of numerous jokes, parodies, and humorous personal anecdotes. 
 
 1. James D. Gordon III, How Not to Succeed in Law School, 100 YALE L.J. 1679, 1684, 
1685, 1687 (1991). 
 2. A paraphrase of the slogan of recent Miracle Whip commercials. The actual slogan is 
“A sandwich just isn’t a sandwich without Miracle Whip.” 
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Some, however, are not laughing.3 Among the unamused are a 
rising number of scholars who have challenged the methodological 
foundations of the Socratic method. These scholars claim that the 
Socratic emperor’s clothes are in fact imaginary garments that have 
been fabricated and perpetuated by methodological swindlers.4 They 
have joined students who have “attacked the Socratic method as in-
fantilizing, demeaning, dehumanizing, sadistic, a tactic for promot-
ing hostility and competition among students, self-serving, and de-
structive of positive ideological values.”5 In recent years, the 
liberated voices of feminist legal scholars have joined in the imperial 
exposure and have revived the debate over the continued vitality of 
the Socratic method in law school classrooms.  These scholars have 
raised additional concerns regarding the method as it specifically af-
fects female law students.6 
This Comment explores the vitality of the Socratic method in 
light of the newly raised concerns of feminist critics. Part II defines 
the Socratic method and summarizes the history leading up to its 
adoption as the primary methodology for legal education. In addi-
tion, Part II sets forth the rationales generally proffered to justify So-
cratic teaching. Part III discusses the general criticisms leveled 
against Socratic teaching. Part IV focuses on women’s entrance into 
the legal profession, with specific attention given to the implications 
of this entrance for legal education. Part IV also discusses the results 
of recent studies that probe accusations that the Socratic method 
creates or exacerbates gender differentials in legal education that ad-
versely impact female law students. Part IV concludes with an evalua-
tion of the Socratic method as viewed through the lenses of various 
feminist theories. Part V considers the continued vitality of the So-
 
 3. One study, in requesting students to describe their instructors, elicited the following 
responses: 
a “fearful trial court judge,” an “inquisitor,” or a “pounding . . . adversary.” All [in 
the study] who professed nervousness thought they detected faculty hostility and 
perceived some degree of intimidation. . . . A number pointed to their “pathological 
fear of being called on in class,” particularly in larger groups: “There’s the fear of 
being exposed as an intellectual weakling in front of a lot of people you don’t 
know.” 
Robert Stevens, Law Schools and Law Students, 59 VA. L. REV. 551, 641 (1973). 
 4. See Russell L. Weaver, Langdell’s Legacy: Living with the Case Method, 36 VILL. L. 
REV. 517, 583 (1991) (introducing the fairy tale analogy). 
 5. Alan A. Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARV. L. REV. 392, 407 (1971). 
 6. See infra Part IV.B–D. 
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cratic method in legal education and explores the contours of a 
“modified” Socratic methodology that accommodates feminist criti-
cisms in a way that “humanizes” Socratic teaching without under-
mining the fundamental benefits of the method. Part VI provides a 
concluding summary of the analysis and recommendations addressed 
in this Comment. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. What Is the Socratic Method?—Definitions and Descriptions 
1. Origins of the “legal” use of the Socratic method 
The origin of the term “Socratic method,” as used in the legal 
context, has generally been attributed to Christopher Columbus 
Langdell, Dean of Harvard Law School and (in)famous originator of 
the case method.7 Langdell, whose deanship began in the early 
1870s, saw “the Socratic dialogue [as] a necessary adjunct to the case 
method of study.”8 No historical record contains an explicit defini-
tion of the Socratic method as Langdell perceived it; however, in ap-
plication, Langdell’s use of the case and Socratic methods in the 
classroom has been described as follows: 
Langdell began his actual teaching by having each of the cases, 
which the students had to study carefully in preparation for the 
class, briefly analyzed by one of them with respect to the facts and 
the law contained in it. He then added a series of questions, which 
were so arranged as gradually to lay bare the entire law contained in 
that particular case. This stimulated questions, doubts, and objec-
tions on the part of individual students, against whom the teacher 
had to hold his ground in reply. Teacher and pupils then, accord-
ing to Langdell’s design, work together unremittingly to extract 
from the single cases and from the combination or contrasting of 
cases their entire legal content, so that in the end those principles 
of that particular branch of the law which control the entire mass of 
related cases are made clear. The two ideas taken together suggest 
and are sufficiently well described by the term “Socratic  
 
 
 7. See JOSEF REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN 
UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOLS 12 (1914). 
 8. Stone, supra note 5, at 406. 
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method,”—an expression which was indeed early employed by 
Langdell and his pupils.9 
Thus, the rudiments of the Socratic method entered the law 
school classroom on the heels of the case method, and, indeed, the 
two have continued in tandem ever since. 
2. Contemporary definitions of the Socratic method 
Since Langdell’s time, many definitions of the Socratic method 
have been proffered. The dictionary defines the Socratic method as 
Socrates’ “philosophical method of systematic doubt and question-
ing of another to reveal his hidden ignorance or to elicit a clear ex-
pression of a truth supposed to be implicitly known by all rational 
beings.”10 In the law school context, the Socratic method has been 
defined as “involv[ing] a teacher asking a series of questions, ideally 
to a single student, in an attempt to lead the student down a chain of 
reasoning either forward, to its conclusions, or backward, to its as-
sumptions.”11 Another commentator described the method as “a 
pedagogy characterized by self-discovery, in which the student learns 
to approach legal problems through a dialogue guided by the law 
teacher.”12 More cynical definitions of the Socratic method resemble 
the following: 
[T]he modern Socratic dialogue resembles a game of “hide the 
ball” in which the professor asks questions that he knows the an-
swers to while his students do not. The object of the game is to 
produce the answer that the professor thinks is correct. If the  
 
 
 
 9. REDLICH, supra note 7, at 12. Interestingly, the use of the Socratic method is actu-
ally older than Langdell. It had been employed by at least one practitioner, “Richard M. Pear-
son of North Carolina, whose private law school lasted into the 1870s.” LAWRENCE M. 
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 529 (1973). Pearson “‘adopted the methods of 
Socrates, Plato and Aristotle’; students read their books, then came to his office twice a week, 
where he ‘would examine them upon what they read by asking them questions.’ . . . At least 
one student thought he was ‘the greatest teacher that ever lived on the earth.’” Id. (quoting 
Albert Coates, The Story of the Law School at the University of North Carolina, 47 N.C. L. REV. 
1, 9–10 (1968)). 
 10. WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1119 (1986). 
 11. Susan H. Williams, Legal Education, Feminist Epistemology, and the Socratic Method, 
45 STAN. L. REV. 1571, 1573 (1993). 
 12. Jennifer L. Rosato, The Socratic Method and Women Law Students: Humanize, Don’t 
Feminize, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 37, 43 (1997). 
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student fails to answer correctly, personal humiliation follows in 
various forms.13 
The varying definitions of the Socratic method have led at least 
one commentator to argue that “[t]here appears to be no fixed defi-
nition of the Socratic Method. Each teacher conceptualizes it in her 
own way.”14 Nevertheless, it seems safe to say that, at a bare mini-
mum, “[a]ny definition of the Socratic Method includes a dialogue 
between teacher and student—an ‘education by interrogation.’”15 
3. “Idyllic” glimpses of the Socratic method in action 
In actual application, the Socratic method has often been de-
scribed in terms of “Socratic kung fu.” Advocates of the method 
(yes, these are the advocates!) tout the Socratic method as a form of 
“ritualized combat,”16 a “civilized battle,”17 a “boot camp”18 of 
sorts, in which professors utterly “destroy”19 students by making 
“friendly assault[s]”20 on their answers. Such advocates imbue the 
Socratic method with an uncanny sado-masochistic quality, as illus-
trated by the following personal anecdote of a pro–Socratic method 
author: 
Law school posed a new form of terror for me; it clearly had caught 
my full attention. It was only November—three months into the 
first year—and I recall I was thinking about how we had already 
lost 15 percent of the class. Just then Father Vachon [the profes-
sor] bellowed out, “Mr. Rabkin [the author], please stand and ex-
plain the facts and result in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Com-
pany.” Oh, no! I was terribly shy. This would not be fun. What 
seemed like hours, numerous questions and many bouts of humili-
ating laughter later, the law professor told me dryly and without a 
smile, “You may be seated.” The New Inquisition had ended. 
 
 13. Id. at 41–42 (footnotes omitted). 
 14. Id. at 40. 
 15. Id. 
 16. ABA COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, ELUSIVE EQUALITY: THE 
EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN IN LEGAL EDUCATION 3 (1996) (quoting Renee H. Neary, The 
Gender Rap, ABA J., Aug. 1995, at 10, 10). 
 17. Burnele V. Powell, A Defense of the Socratic Method: An Interview with Martin B. 
Louis (1934-94), 73 N.C. L. REV. 957, 961 (1995). 
 18. Alan Rabkin, Technology vs. The Socratic Method, NEV. LAW., Feb. 1998, at 6. 
 19. Powell, supra note 17, at 961. 
 20. Id. 
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There was no praise for right answers, as they were expected. There 
was a liberal dose of criticism. . . . I hated it. I loved it.21 
Likewise, another staunch advocate of the Socratic method, in 
recalling his own experiences as a student under this method, related 
the following: 
I frankly found [it] appealing—trying to deal with [Professor] 
Chayes’s flashing assaults on your answers, or [Professor] Jaffee’s 
much more cerebral destruction of your answers. Either way, it was 
enjoyable to do battle with them. 
. . . 
I remember incidents in which each of them destroyed me utterly. 
My reaction was, I hope you’ll never do that to me again, but I 
came back for more the next day.22 
Such descriptions of the Socratic method have led many to won-
der how such combative sado-masochism became the centerpiece of 
legal pedagogy. 
B. Historical Underpinnings of the Socratic Method 
Prior to 1870, law students gained their education by an appren-
ticeship, by self-study, or by attending one of the ever increasing 
number of college-associated law schools.23 The rise of college law 
schools in the latter part of the nineteenth century demarcated the 
beginning of formal methodological approaches to legal education.24 
 
 21. Rabkin, supra note 18, at 6. 
 22. Powell, supra note 17, at 960. 
 23. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 525–26 (chronicling in numbers the rise of college-
based law schools as the apprenticeship system began to die out). 
 24. Actually, prior to the rise of college-based law schools, some practitioners who had 
proved themselves to be proficient teachers had expanded their apprenticeships into more or 
less private law schools and had developed a teaching methodology based on lectures. See id. at 
279. The most famous of these, the so-called “Litchfield school,” was presided over by Judge 
Tapping Reeve, who instructed his students over a fourteen month period by means of a series 
of 139 lectures, under ten headings, based on Blackstone’s Commentaries. See id.; see also 
ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW 131 
(1921). This methodology was described as follows: “[T]he complete course comprised a daily 
lecture, lasting from an hour and a quarter to an hour and a half . . . . Students were required 
to write up their notes carefully, to do collateral reading, and to stand a strict examination 
every Saturday upon the work of the week.” Id. The students’ copious notes of the lectures 
provided them “with a set of elementary handbooks to carry with [them] into practice.” JAMES  
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In the college setting, the primary method of legal education was the 
textbook/lecture method. Under this method, students read and 
more or less memorized the textbook selections assigned for each 
recitation period. 25 In class, the teacher spent part of the hour ex-
plaining the material to the students, while the remainder of the time 
was occupied with the “mechanical testing” or “quizzing” of the 
material students had memorized.26 In 1870, however, with the ap-
pointment of Langdell as Dane Professor of Law and Dean of Har-
vard Law School, the traditional lecture/textbook method was about 
to meet its match. With Langdell’s help, the face of legal education 
was about to undergo a monumental makeover. 
Like his namesake, whose discoveries changed the world’s con-
ception of the earth as it was then known, Christopher Columbus 
Langdell sought to effect similarly significant changes in the arena of 
legal education. Among the reforms for which Langdell has been 
credited are (1) the requirement of a law school admission test,27 (2) 
the institution of a three-year law degree program,28 (3) the concep-
tion of a graded curriculum, divided into “courses” of so many hour-
units apiece,29 (4) the establishment of final examinations,30 and (5) 
the creation of full-time professorships.31 However, these reforms all 
pale in comparison to Langdell’s most significant and far-reaching 
reform—the introduction of the case method of instruction.32 
 
WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 259 (1950). The lectures were “supple-
mented by moot courts over which the schoolmaster or his assistant presided.” Id. 
 25. See REDLICH, supra note 7, at 7–8. 
 26. See id. at 8. 
 27. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 530–31. The test imposed by Langdell was, how-
ever, only applicable to students who did not have a college degree. See id. at 530. The test 
itself consisted of the following: “The prospective student had to show his knowledge of Latin, 
translating from Virgil, or Cicero, or from Caesar; he was also tested on Blackstone’s Commen-
taries. Skill in French was acceptable as a substitute for Latin.” Id. at 531. 
 28. See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 
1850S TO THE 1980S 36–37 (1983). 
 29. See id. at 36; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 531. 
 30. See HURST, supra note 24, at 263. 
 31. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 528. Perhaps even more interesting was Langdell’s 
appointment of full-time professors who had little or no practical legal experience. See id. at 
533–34. According to Langdell, “[w]hat qualifies a person . . . to teach law, [sic] is not experi-
ence in the work of a lawyer’s office, not experience in dealing with men, not experience in the 
trial or argument of cases, not experience, in short, in using law, but experience in learning 
law.” STEVENS, supra note 28, at 38. 
 32. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 531. The practice of teaching law through cases, 
however, was actually not an original creation of Langdell’s. See KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC 
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The case method “cast out the textbooks, and [in their place] 
used . . . cases, carefully selected and arranged to illustrate the mean-
ing and development of principles of law.”33 This fundamental altera-
tion of the basic materials of legal study brought with it an even 
more fundamental change in the teaching style of law professors. No 
longer was the professor a lecturing revelator of dogmatic principles; 
rather, he became “a Socratic guide, leading the student to an un-
derstanding of concepts and principles hidden as essences among the 
cases.”34 Thus, the birth of the Socratic method was intimately inter-
twined with the replacement of textbooks by cases as the sole source 
of instruction material. 
Within fifty years of its introduction, the case method and the 
accompanying Socratic method were firmly entrenched as the back-
bone of legal education.35 “By the 1920s, anybody who was anybody 
in the law school ‘industry’ used the case method,”36 presumably in 
tandem with the Socratic dialogue. 
One would assume that such a complete paradigmatic shift over 
a relatively short period of time could only be accomplished if the ra-
tionale underlying the adoption of the new method were fundamen-
tally sound. Part II.C discusses the validity of this assumption. 
C. Rationales for Employing the Socratic Method 
Many rationales have been proffered to justify the adoption of 
the case and Socratic methods since their conception within the walls 
of Harvard Law School 130 years ago. Some rationales attempt to 
capture the true pedagogical value of the method; others, however,  
suggest that the widespread adoption and use of the Socratic method 
reflect various ulterior motives. 
 
 
MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 220 (1989) (noting that the first case books had been 
prepared as early as 1810). John Norton Pomeroy had employed the case method at New York 
University Law School in the 1860s, but Pomeroy did not “shape the whole program of a 
leading school to a new technique.” See HURST, supra note 24, at 261. Such a systematic ap-
plication of the method was only achieved later through Langdell. 
 33. FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 531. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See STEVENS, supra note 28, at 123. 
 36. Id. 
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1. Pedagogical rationales 
a. Improves upon the textbook/lecture method. As mentioned 
above, the case and Socratic methods arrived on the heels of the 
textbook/lecture method and, at least in part, were a reaction to the 
inadequacies of textbook/lecture instruction. As Charles Eliot, 
president at Harvard during Langdell’s tenure, described it: “the lec-
turer pumps laboriously into sieves. The water may be wholesome 
but it runs through.”37 Likewise, James Barr Ames, Langdell’s prod-
igy, decried the textbook/lecture system as not “a virile system. It 
treats the student not as a man, but as a school boy reciting his 
lines.”38 Put more pragmatically by one student under this system: 
Every one of us dutifully took notes from the beautifully prepared 
lectures and a week before the exam we pulled them out for the 
first time and gave some thought to the course. We learned enough 
to get by, and within two weeks forgot everything we’d ever 
learned. . . . I found the lecture method, particularly for me, to be a 
total failure.39 
Thus, the Socratic method was seen, at least in part, as an effort 
to rescue students from the endless droning of lecturing professors 
by requiring students to participate in their own learning. 
b. Promotes active learning. Second, in contrast to the passivity of 
the textbook/lecture method, the Socratic method purports to pro-
vide a more “active” learning environment. The Socratic method 
“stimulates [the student’s] legal imagination and makes him re-
sourceful in seeking remedies for every difficulty. It makes him ques-
tion the validity and applicability of every generalization. It develops 
toughness and resilience of mind and the capacity and willingness to 
form and act upon his considered judgment in important situa-
tions.”40 
c. Teaches students to be self-educators. Third, the Socratic method 
is “an empowering method because it shifts some of the responsibil-
ity for learning directly onto the student.”41 In other words, it puts 
 
 37. Id. at 54 (quoting AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
617 (Richard Hofstadter & Wilson Smith eds., 1961)). 
 38. STEVENS, supra note 28, at 54 (quoting JAMES BARR AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL 
HISTORY AND MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS 362 (1913)). 
 39. Powell, supra note 17, at 963–64. 
 40. Edmund M. Morgan, The Case Method, 4 J. LEGAL EDUC. 379, 387 (1952). 
 41. Rosato, supra note 12, at 44. 
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students in the driver’s seat of their legal education by teaching them 
how to teach themselves: 
Just as a professor who immediately answers her students’ questions 
loses an opportunity to help them discover the answers on their 
own, the professor who dispenses legal principles in classroom so-
liloquies will reduce students’ opportunities to engage in independ-
ent critical thinking that could lead them to a deeper understand-
ing of the material.42 
d. Teaches skill of thinking on your feet. In addition, the Socratic 
method has been praised for helping students develop analytical skills 
and thinking on their feet.43 “Socratic discourse requires participants 
to articulate, develop and defend positions that may at first be imper-
fectly defined intuitions.”44 
e. Highlights the complexity of the law. Finally, the Socratic 
method has been praised for its ability to instill in students a sense of 
the complexity of the law—that in many cases there simply is no 
“one right answer” that applies across the board. “[T]he Socratic 
[m]ethod places in high relief the absence of easy answers to legal 
problems.”45 “[T]he Socratic method helps to induce that kind of 
cautious skepticism, that kind of lack of egotistic belief that one un-
derstands fully the nature of a difficult situation.”46 
2. Ulterior motives 
Unfortunately, not all rationales underpinning the adoption of 
the Socratic method are based on the goal of effective pedagogy. In 
fact, a number of ulterior motives have been ascribed to the adoption 
and continued use of Socratic teaching in legal education. 
a. Snobbism. The first rationale (and quite possibly the most du-
bious from a pedagogical standpoint) was the desire to gain respect-
ability for the law as a subject worthy of academic scholarship.47 In 
 
 42. Elizabeth Garrett, Becoming Lawyers: The Role of the Socratic Method in Modern Law 
Schools, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 199, 201 (1998) (reviewing LANI GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING 
GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1997)). 
 43. Cynthia G. Hawkins-Leon, The Socratic Method-Problem Method Dichotomy: The De-
bate Over Teaching Method Continues, BYU EDUC. & L.J., Spring 1998, at 1, 5. 
 44. Garrett, supra note 42, at 201. 
 45. Id. at 202. “[T]o provide certainty where there is none or to give a neat framework 
where the law is messy is to teach dishonestly.” Id. at 202–03. 
 46. Powell, supra note 17, at 969. 
 47. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 536. 
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the 1870s, the study of law had just wedged the tip of its boot in the 
door of college-level study. “Professionalizing” law became a high 
priority. Langdell’s adoption of the case and Socratic methods made 
great strides in this direction. For Langdell, the case and Socratic 
methods were an outgrowth of his belief “that law was a ‘science’ 
consisting of a cohesive body of clearly discernible ‘principles or doc-
trines’ . . . .”48 This conception of law as a science had the effect of 
“exalt[ing] the prestige of law and legal learning; . . . it affirmed that 
legal science stood apart as . . . a branch of learning that genuinely 
demanded rigorous formal training.”49 Moreover, once the “elite” 
law schools adopted the method, “those aspiring to be considered 
elite rapidly followed.”50 Thus, after its initial adoption at Harvard 
and other elite schools, the Socratic method perpetuated itself by 
means of snobbism. Interestingly, the conception of law as a science 
has been thoroughly repudiated since Langdell’s time.51 
b. Economic efficiency. A second, and similarly dubious, rationale 
for the adoption of the case and Socratic methods was the notion 
that the Socratic method provided financial benefits to the collegiate 
institutions in which it was implemented. In other words, by offering 
an “educational program or innovation that allowed one man to 
teach even more students,”52 the Socratic method held the financial 
“trump card.”53 Moreover, the use of the Socratic method purported 
to be pedagogically effective in the large-class environment since 
[a] teaching strategy which includes calling on students without 
giving them prior notice is one of the best ways to foster critical 
thinking for all members of such a large group. . . . [T]he element 
of surprise provides a powerful incentive for them to . . . . prepare  
for class, which will enable them to learn more from the Socratic 
dialogue that takes place.”54 
 
 48. Stone, supra note 5, at 406 (quoting CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION 
OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS viii (2d ed. 1879)). 
 49. FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 536. 
 50. STEVENS, supra note 28, at 63. 
 51. See id. at 156 (noting that “[t]he major contribution of the Realist movement was 
to kill the Langdellian notion of law as an exact science . . . .”). 
 52. STEVENS, supra note 28, at 63. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Garrett, supra note 42, at 201–02. Vicarious learning is an important part of the 
Socratic method: 
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c. Inertia. A third, nonpedagogical rationale for adopting the 
case method explains, in part, its firm entrenchment in the current 
world of legal education. Now that Socratic teaching has been the 
established mode of legal education for decades, new law professors 
gravitate to the Socratic method because most of them experienced 
it as students, and, in the absence of any formal training in teaching 
methods or theory, “it is natural for them to use it when they begin 
to teach.”55 Moreover, since virtually all faculty members (who, al-
most without exception, had outstanding law school grades) pros-
pered under the Socratic method, their natural affinity for the 
method is understandable.56 
d. Professorial convenience. A fourth inauspicious motive is that 
the Socratic method is convenient for professors. 
If [the professor] encounters some horrible rat’s nest of the law in-
volving the application of the Rule against Perpetuities to a com-
pound trust, he is not compelled to stay up struggling with it for 
four consecutive nights with a wet towel around his head, as is his 
brother in practice [or his students]. He can just let it alone, in the 
serene confidence that [some other professor] will some day work 
it all out and put it in a book.57 
Thus, since Socratic teaching effectively shifts the original burden of 
organizing and synthesizing material to the student, professors are  
 
 
[S]tudents [who are not directly involved in the dialogue at any given moment] are 
participating silently in the discussion by following the dialogue, and are thinking 
about which questions they could ask and answer themselves. It is as if all are players 
in an exciting game with their hands on the buzzers, ready to respond at a mo-
ment’s notice. 
Rosato, supra note 12, at 44. 
 55. Weaver, supra note 4, at 544. 
 56. The dubiousness of this rationale is exposed by the following comment: 
Sometimes it seems that law teachers use the Socratic Method because it is the 
teaching method they are most comfortable with or—worse yet—because it is the 
only method that they know. As with any teaching method, this one should be used 
to accomplish educational objectives carefully developed by the teacher. . . . If the 
teacher cannot articulate why the Socratic Method is being used, it may not be the 
appropriate pedagogy or the teacher’s educational objectives may not be sufficiently 
defined. 
Rosato, supra note 12, at 61 (footnotes omitted). 
 57. Deborah L. Rhode, Missing Questions: Feminist Perspectives on Legal Education, 45 
STAN. L. REV. 1547, 1549 (1993) (quoting William L. Prosser, Lighthouse No Good, 1 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 257, 260–61 (1948) (second alternation in original)). 
7GAR-FIN.DOC 12/9/00  1:41 PM 
1597] Socratic Misogyny? 
 1609 
relieved, at least in part, from the pressure to explain the fine points 
in complex areas of law. 
III. GENERAL CRITICISMS OF THE SOCRATIC METHOD 
Despite the rationales favoring the Socratic method, it has never 
been in short supply of detractors. This section explores the general 
criticisms leveled against the Socratic method as a prelude to the 
more recent concerns arising from feminist critiques of Socratic 
teaching. 
A. Leads to Boredom 
First, even some advocates of the Socratic method “concede[] 
[the] fact that the Socratic method has lost its hold on law students 
by the second year.”58 “It is true that for most students the first year 
is exciting. The fresh incisiveness of approach, the active classroom, 
the impatience with fuzzy college ways are a great experience. But 
after the first year the excitement fades . . . . All too often law school 
ends with students merely marking time.”59 In other words, over 
time, students simply become bored with the method.60 While the 
overuse of any method can eventually bore students, the boredom 
brought on by Socratic overload seems particularly disturbing be-
cause, as discussed below,61 the material laboriously elicited from 
students in Socratic dialogues could be communicated much more 
efficiently by less time-consuming means. 
B. Vicarious Learning Is a Hoax 
A second general criticism leveled at the Socratic method is that 
its reliance on vicarious learning is a hoax.62 “‘For many students the 
Socratic method must consist of listening to others answer questions 
 
 58. Frank R. Strong, The Pedagogic Training of a Law Faculty, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 226, 
236 (1973). 
 59. Charles A. Reich, Toward the Humanistic Study of Law, 74 YALE L.J. 1402, 1402 
(1965). 
 60. See Weaver, supra note 4, at 561–64 (noting that most of the skills developed 
through the Socratic method can be learned in less than three years); see also Edwin W. Patter-
son, The Case Method in American Legal Education: Its Origins and Objectives, 4 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 1, 18 (1951) (noting that “once the routine analysis is learned, many students become 
bored with the formal statement of cases”). 
 61. See infra Part III.C. 
 62. See Strong, supra note 58, at 235. 
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99 percent of the time and answering them themselves only 1  
percent of the time.”63 Thus, since a Socratic dialogue generally con-
sists of a conversation between the professor and one student, 
much of the student “doing” must be vicarious [and] [d]espite in-
dulgence of an assumption that when the method is properly ex-
plained each and every other student will learn when a classmate 
and the instructor are in dialogue, there is reason to be highly du-
bious of the effectiveness of vicarious classroom practice.64 
Proponents of the Socratic method, however, have justified its one-
on-one dialogue in large class settings because, when professors call 
on students at random, “[t]he risk of being questioned induces . . . 
vicarious participation.”65 
C. Inefficient to Convey Large Amounts of Information 
A third complaint against the Socratic method is that it is an inef-
ficient way to convey large amounts of information.66 Indeed, the 
time necessary to develop a point of law through Socratic dialogue 
creates “the temptation on the teacher’s part to revert to lecture in 
order to achieve ‘coverage,’ thus falling back on the poorest form of  
learning pattern.”67 In reality, compensating for the law student’s de-
 
 63. James Eagar, The Right Tool for the Job: The Effective Use of Pedagogical Methods in 
Legal Education, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 389, 401 (1996–97) (quoting Peter B. Maggs & Thomas 
D. Morgan, Computer-Based Legal Education at the University of Illinois: A Report of Two 
Year’s Experience, 27 J. LEGAL EDUC. 138, 140 (1975)). 
 64. Strong, supra note 58, at 235. Nevertheless, some maintain that other students will 
pay attention since “the moment the student has any trouble or I [the professor] want a more 
in-depth answer, they know I’ll be looking around the rest of the room. So I would say the 
room can’t go to sleep because I will be asking the room to help out.” Powell, supra note 17, 
at 982. 
 65. Phillip E. Areeda, The Socratic Method (SM) (Lecture at Puget Sound, 1/31/90), 109 
HARV. L. REV. 911, 916 (1996). 
 66. See Weaver, supra note 4, at 519; see also Patterson, supra note 60, at 19, 22. More 
cynical critics have suggested that the stuffy academics somehow see the idea of teaching legal 
rules as something akin to a trade school. See Rhode, supra note 57, at 1555. Thus, the more 
ethereal aspects of Socratic teaching somehow make the practice of law more like a profession 
and less like a trade. 
 67. Strong, supra note 58, at 235. Advocates of the method, however, have offered the 
following rebuttal to this charge: 
Faculty were willing to trade off course coverage for Socratic discussion. This trade-
off [sic] is inherent in the case method, an extremely time consuming and inefficient 
way to impart information. Legal rules can be stated much more quickly by the  
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ficiency in substantive training is left to the legal employers, who (in 
the absence of any viable alternative) are “willing (though sometimes 
grudgingly) to supply the practical training that law school ne-
glects.”68 Unfortunately, “[a]ttorneys who work for less affluent cli-
ents and organizations find such assistance harder to come by.”69 
D. “Hide the Ball” 
Finally, students often condemn the method as “a scholarly ver-
sion of the childhood game,”70 “hide the ball,”71 in which professors 
attempt to “hide the legal issue and keep students confused” by re-
fusing to answer student questions and resolve debates on the is-
sues.72 Poking fun at this point of criticism, one commentator stated: 
The key to the Socratic method is that the professor never reveals 
what the answer is. He keeps insisting that THERE IS NO 
ANSWER. . . . To get the answers, you have to buy commercial 
outlines, which cost $16.95 apiece and are published by the same 
people who publish Cliffs Notes and Key Comics.73 
“The result [of Socratic teaching] is a climate in which ‘never is 
heard an encouraging word and the thoughts remain cloudy all day.’ 
For many students, the clouds never really lift until after graduation, 
when a commercial bar review cram course fills in what professional 
educators missed or mystified.”74 
Other criticisms (some of which will be revisited below) include 
the perception by students that the Socratic method (1) has a “ten-
dency to demean and degrade the student,” (2) “neglect[s] the sub-
stance of the law,” and (3) “foster[s] monopolization by a vocal 
few.”75 Thus, when feminist legal scholars turned their attention to  
 
 
lecture method. But, faculty accept this drawback for the advantage of having stu-
dents undertake their own analysis. 
Weaver, supra note 4, at 547. 
 68. Rhode, supra note 57, at 1559.  
 69. Id. 
 70. Eagar, supra note 63, at 402 (quoting Weaver, supra note 4, at 519). 
 71. Weaver, supra note 4, at 519. 
 72. Id. at 519 n.5. 
 73. Gordon, supra note 1, at 1685. 
 74. Rhode, supra note 57, at 1555 (quoting Grant Gilmore, What Is a Law School?, 15 
CONN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1982)). 
 75. Stevens, supra note 3, at 638. 
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the Socratic method, they found an ample springboard from which 
to launch their critiques. 
IV. FEMINIST CRITICISMS OF THE SOCRATIC METHOD 
Despite the criticisms of the Socratic method that have abounded 
from its inception, the entrance of women into legal education por-
tended a distinct set of criticisms against the method. Part IV.A 
briefly highlights the entrance of women into the legal profession 
and into law schools, in particular. Part IV.B summarizes the results 
of significant studies relating to the experiences of women law stu-
dents with respect to classroom dynamics. The results of each study 
are arranged in chronological order in order to facilitate tracking the 
legal scholarship in this area. The study results are followed by a 
summary section, Part IV.C, which attempts to provide a holistic in-
tegration of the study results. Finally, Part IV.D interprets these find-
ings in light of current feminist theories. 
A. Women Enter the Arena of Legal Education and the Practice of 
Law 
The first woman allowed to join the bar in modern times was 
Arabella Mansfield, who was admitted in Iowa in 1869, one year 
prior to Langdell’s appointment at Harvard.76 Indeed, the University 
of Iowa was the first American law school to open its doors to 
women.77 Iowa was followed shortly by the University of Michigan, 
and, in 1872, Boston University admitted women as well.78 Never-
theless, the general feeling about women in the profession was more 
accurately expressed by the now dubious comment of Supreme 
Court Justice Joseph Bradley: “[T]he natural and proper timidity 
and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for 
many of the occupations of civil life. . . . The paramount destiny and 
mission of women are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife 
and mother.”79 
The elite law schools tended more towards Justice Bradley’s sen-
timent. In 1872, one alumnus of Yale Law School commented: “In 
theory I am in favor of [women] studying law and practicing law, 
 
 76. See STEVENS, supra note 28, at 82. 
 77. See id. 
 78. See id. 
 79. Id. (quoting Justice Bradley in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 131 (1873)). 
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provided they are ugly.”80 At what was to become George Washing-
ton University, the sentiment was that “the admission of women into 
the Law School was not required by any public want.”81 Similarly, at 
Harvard, the prevailing view was expressed by Professor Thayer, 
whose opinion was that “he should regret the presence of a woman 
in his classes, because he feared it might affect the excellence of the 
work of the men . . . .”82 Langdell himself also opposed admitting 
women, and, apparently, his influence was strong since Harvard did 
not admit its first female law student until 1950.83 “Washington & 
Lee still barred women as late as 1972.”84 Even as late as 1970, 
“only 6.35% of degree candidates at law school were women.”85 
Undoubtedly, gaining admission to law school was progress; 
however, access to the legal edifice not only opened the door of op-
portunity but also marked the threshold of new, internal forms of 
discrimination. For example, until the late 1960s, women at Harvard 
Law School were required to explain to the entire faculty why they 
were attending law school. 86 At Brooklyn law school, women and 
men were physically segregated in the classroom.87 In other law class-
rooms, professors engaged in discriminatory teaching styles, “rarely 
call[ing] on women to answer questions in class, or call[ing] on 
them only to answer questions on selected topics, such as rape. A few 
professors even designated a ‘Ladies Day,’ when they called exclu-
sively on female students.”88 As one commentator aptly put it, “Until 
 
 80. STEVENS, supra note 28, at 83 (quoting FREDERICK C. HICKS, YALE LAW SCHOOL: 
1869-1894, at 72–76 (1937)). 
 81. Id. (quoting ELMER LOUIS KAYSER, BRICKS WITHOUT STRAW 166 (1970)). 
 82. STEVENS, supra note 28, at 83. 
 83. See id. at 83–84. 
In commenting on women’s admission to Harvard Law School in 1950, then Dean 
Griswold reassured anxious alumni that this development was not very important or 
very significant. Most of us have seen women from time to time in our lives and 
have managed to survive the shock. I think we can take it, and I doubt that it will 
change the character of the School or even its atmosphere to any detectable extent. 
Rhode, supra note 57, at 1547 (quoting Erwin Griswold, Developments at the Law School, 
1950 HARV. L. SCH. Y.B. 10). 
 84. Taunya Lovell Banks, Gender Bias in the Classroom, 14 S. ILL. U. L.J. 527, 527 n.1 
(1990) [hereinafter Banks II]. 
 85. STEVENS, supra note 28, at 234. 
 86. See Janet Taber et al., Gender, Legal Education, and the Legal Profession: An Empiri-
cal Study of Stanford Law Students and Graduates, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1210 (1988). 
 87. See id. 
 88. Id. 
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the 1980s women were merely tokens in law school and the legal  
profession.”89 In effect, the steady rise in the admission of women to 
law school seemed to be accompanied by the implicit caveat that 
“[w]omen were . . . expected to [simply] join the academic proces-
sion, not to question its direction.”90 
Despite these obstacles, women persevered in pursuing legal 
education. In 1990, fifty-two percent of those admitted to the bar 
were women.91 As the number of women entering law school and 
the legal profession has continued to rise, and women’s voices on le-
gal issues, including legal education, began to fall on open ears, 
some of the more blatant forms of discrimination against women 
have dissipated. However, some argue that more subtle forms of dis-
crimination continue to exist in areas such as the differential impact 
of the Socratic method on women. Indeed, the relatively recent addi-
tion of feminist criticisms of the Socratic method has added new fuel 
to the fire kindled by long-standing opponents of the Socratic 
method. 
B. Results of Studies Regarding the Experiences of Female Law 
Students 
“Today’s women may have equal access to legal education, but they do 
not necessarily receive an equal legal education.” 92 
Over the past twelve years, feminist legal scholars have begun to 
explore the differences in the way men and women law students ex-
perience law school. Such feminist critiques of legal education have 
included both experiential and empirical studies covering a wide va-
riety of issues relating to women’s law school experiences, from rea-
sons for going to law school, to grades, to self-esteem, and so on. A 
few of these studies have drawn conclusions specifically relating to 
the use of the Socratic method. Others have collected data that relate 
to classroom dynamics and thus may provide indirect insight into  
 
 89. Robert Granfield, Contextualizing the Different Voice: Women, Occupational Goals, 
and Legal Education, 16 LAW & POL’Y 1, 12 (1994). 
 90. Rhode, supra note 57, at 1547 (quoting VIRGINIA WOOLF, THREE GUINEAS 62-63 
(1938)). 
 91. ABA COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, supra note 16, at 6 n.14 
(quoting ABA COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, WOMEN IN THE LAW: A LOOK 
AT THE NUMBERS (1995)). 
 92. Banks II, supra note 84, at 528. 
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the experiences of women with the Socratic method and the ques-
tions concerning the continuing value of Socratic teaching. 
1. The Yale study: 1988 
The first significant study to address the implications of Socratic 
teaching with respect to women law students was the Yale study.93 
The Yale study was an experiential study that consisted of a narrative 
compilation of interviews with twenty women, who belonged to a 
student women’s group, in the Yale Law School class of 1987. 
a. Classroom participation. The Yale study reported, among other 
things, widespread “alienation” of women in the law school class-
room. 94 The study suggested (1) that women fail to participate in 
class out of fear95 or out of a general unwillingness to engage in the 
“showmanship” called for in the Socratic classroom,96 (2) that some 
who begin to participate stop because they feel uncomfortable or 
unwelcome,97 and (3) that some who are determined to participate 
and do participate, nevertheless, feel the pressure of speaking for all 
women.98 
b. Professors’ role in alienation. The anecdotes suggested that the 
alienation resulting in women’s “silence in the classroom”99 was 
caused by professors who (1) “ignored or trivialized” points made by 
women, and later gave credence to the same ideas when expressed by 
men,100 (2) “used male pronouns exclusively,”101 (3) featured only 
men in hypothetical questions,102 (4) presumed everyone “under-
 
 93. Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 
STAN. L. REV. 1299 (1988). Other studies of women’s experience in legal education were per-
formed earlier, but these earlier studies did not directly implicate the Socratic method. See, e.g., 
Alice D. Jacobs, Women in Law School: Structural Constraint and Personal Choice in the For-
mation of Professional Identity, 24 J. LEGAL EDUC. 462 (1972) (discussing issues of role 
stereotyping as it affects women pursuing a legal education). 
 94. In addition to looking at alienation in the classroom, the Yale study also studied 
three other “faces of alienation: from ourselves, from the law school community, . . . and from 
the content of legal education.” Weiss & Melling, supra note 93, at 1299. 
 95. See Weiss & Melling, supra note 93, at 1333. 
 96. See id. at 1335. 
 97. See id. at 1333. 
 98. See id. at 1334. 
 99. Id. at 1327. 
 100. Id. at 1336. 
 101. Id. at 1337. 
 102. See id. 
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stands a sports analogy,”103 and (5) made sexist jokes,104 to name a 
few. In short, the study concluded that, in the law school environ-
ment, “women don’t exist and aren’t worth noticing if they try to 
exist.”105 
c. Implications for Socratic method. From these data, the Yale 
study concluded that the removal of Socratic teaching as the primary 
method of legal pedagogy was warranted: 
I would criticize the starting point—why the Socratic method? It 
sets some people back unnecessarily and bolsters others harmfully. I 
don’t think we’re even producing good litigators, and I don’t think 
we’re training for any other skills. Litigators, even, don’t always 
fight with each other. There’s no need to argue as if you’re going 
in for the kill. It just feeds into stereotypes of what a lawyer is. A 
different beginning message might change the stereotypes. I would 
keep repeating messages of courtesy and listening as long as law 
school lasted.106 
Despite its fervor, the Yale study recognized that its small, nonran-
dom sample concentrated entirely at one school and its failure to in-
terview male law students severely limited the general applicability of 
its findings.107 
2. The Stanford study: 1988  
The Stanford study picked up where the Yale study left off in 
that it attempted to provide some empirical support regarding suspi-
cions of a fundamental disparity between female and male experi-
ences in law school. The Stanford study surveyed the entire student 
body at Stanford Law School (516 total: 45.9 percent female, 54.1 
percent male) and 1528 graduates of the law school (50 percent fe-
male—including all living female graduates—and 50 percent male, a 
random sample of the total).108 
a. Classroom participation. Somewhat surprisingly, the Stanford 
study “found few statistically significant differences between the re-
 
 103. Id. 
 104. See id. at 1336. 
 105. Id. at 1337. 
 106. Id. at 1358. 
 107. See id. at 1302. 
 108. See Taber, et al., supra note 86, at 1232. The Stanford study also collected data re-
garding the experiences of women in the legal profession after law school. 
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sponses of female and male students, or between the responses of 
female and male graduates” with respect to their law school experi-
ences.109 Nevertheless, the Stanford study did provide empirical sup-
port for the notion that male students were more likely than female 
students to ask questions and to volunteer in class, thus “con-
firm[ing] scholars’ claims that professors are more likely to call on 
male students and that male students tend to dominate classroom 
discussions.”110 The study proffered two suggestions to explain the 
participation discrepancy. First, the study suggested that “women 
speak less frequently than do men because they feel less comfortable 
talking in class or because professors call on women less often than 
they do on men.” Alternatively, the study suggested that, while 
women may feel “perfectly comfortable” speaking in class, they may 
choose to do so less often because they are “less interested in domi-
nating classroom discussion and more concerned with furthering col-
legial cooperation.”111 
b. Characteristics admired in professors. Although somewhat less 
directly related to the Socratic method, the Stanford study showed 
no difference between men and women with respect to the qualities 
they most admired in their professors. Among the graduates, how-
ever, a greater number of females than males admired professors who 
demonstrated an openness to questions outside of class, while a 
greater number of males than females favored professors adept at So-
cratic dialogues.112 The study concluded that “[t]he discrepancy be-
tween the findings of the graduate and student data suggests that 
gender differences on these variables may have lessened over time. It  
may be that women are feeling more comfortable in law school and 
therefore do not look to professors to put them at ease.”113 
 
 
 109. Id. at 1238. The areas of legal educational experience examined by the Stanford 
study were (1) satisfaction with performance in law school, (2) qualities admired most in pro-
fessors, (3) participation in class, (4) feelings toward Stanford Law School, and (5) perform-
ance in law school. See id. at 1241–43. 
 110. Id. at 1242. 
 111. Id. The study notes, however, that “our data do not provide sufficient information 
either to support or to refute such hypotheses.” Id. 
 112. See id. at 1238–39 
 113. Id. at 1242. 
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3. The Berkeley study: 1989–90 
The Berkeley study surveyed 667 first-, second-, and third-year 
Boalt students in 1988 with respect to areas such as academic experi-
ence at Boalt, psychological and emotional reactions to the academic 
experience, and academic performance.114 Like the Stanford study, 
the Berkeley study sought empirical support for gender differences 
that were generally confirmed by nonempirical literature such as the 
Yale study.115 The Berkeley study discounted the findings of the 
Stanford study, contending that the findings of the Stanford study 
were “flawed in a number of ways.”116 
a. Classroom participation. The Berkeley study found that, “[i]n 
general, women at Boalt were much less likely than men to partici-
pate in class.”117 In explaining this finding, the Boalt study rejected 
the assumption that “faint-hearted female students . . . . ‘know the 
answer’ as well as men but for various reasons are afraid to ‘speak 
out.’”118 Rather, the study suggested that failure to participate was a 
“counter-code of classroom ethics,”119 involving “a positive decision 
by outsider students not to compromise the integrity of their beliefs 
by submitting them to the narrow analytical perspective of the law 
school classroom.”120 The study indicated that the counter-code was 
more intense in the Socratic classroom and cited a characteristic stu-
dent response in explanation: 
While the Socratic method may originally have been meant to cre-
ate a way for students and professors to exchange ideas, I found 
most (almost all) of my professors using it as a way to ensure stu-
dent participation through forced participation. I am not a child 
 
 114. Suzanne Homer & Lois Schwartz, Admitted but Not Accepted: Outsiders Take an 
Inside Look at Law School, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 24–25 (1989–90). The study also 
collected data regarding career plans and goals and demographic information. Id. at 24. 
 115. See id. at 23. 
 116. Id. at 13. Three flaws were mentioned: (1) the Stanford study did not include suffi-
cient demographic information to allow for investigation of “background characteristics for 
underlying explanations”; (2) the survey design, by its numerous choices, may have had a 
“neutralizing” effect on the results; and (3) the survey failed to adequately distinguish between 
“what women do in law school and how they feel about it.” Id. at 14–15. 
 117. Id. at 29. 
 118. Id. at 37. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. The study further noted that “[s]ilence appears to have evolved into a deliberate 
expression of resistance by many students to an educational system unresponsive to the free 
expression of nonconforming ideas.” Id. at 38. 
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nor am I lazy—I prepare and participate out of interest and resent 
being made to do so out of fear of humiliation.121 
b. Comfort level with same sex professor. The Berkeley study also 
surveyed students regarding their professors. Fifty-seven percent of 
women said they felt “more comfortable with a woman professor’s 
approach to legal thinking,” and forty-six percent “said they were 
more likely to speak in a class taught by a woman professor.”122 A 
large majority of the men, on the other hand, indicated that “there 
was no difference in level of comfort or participation level with fe-
male professors.”123 
4. The first Banks study (“Banks I”): 1988 
In the late 1980s, Taunya Lovell Banks conducted the first of 
two studies regarding women’s experiences in legal education.124 In 
the first study, 765 students (forty-one percent women, fifty-nine 
percent men) from five law schools participated.125 
a. Classroom participation. Consistent with previous studies, 
Banks I found a significant disparity in the overall amount of class 
participation between women and men.126 One unique finding of the 
Banks I study in this respect was that both male and female “reports  
of never volunteering . . . increase[d] with each year of law 
school.”127 In addition, the Banks I study probed the underlying rea-
sons for nonparticipation in situations where students wanted to par-
ticipate. More women than men did not volunteer because they felt 
 
 121. Id. at 37–38. 
 122. Id. at 35. 
 123. Id. (61 percent and 72 percent, respectively). 
 124. Taunya Lovell Banks, Gender Bias in the Classroom, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 137 (1988) 
[hereinafter Banks I]; Banks II, supra note 84. 
 125. See Banks I, supra note 124, at 140. Banks does not provide the names of the 
schools involved but gives the following demographic description: 
Five schools participated in the survey: (1) a western school, (2) a southwestern 
school, (3) a midwestern school, (4) and (5) two northeastern schools. The schools 
included two public institutions, one quasi-public, one private sectarian, and one 
private nonsectarian. Three schools have evening or part-time divisions. Two have 
small enrollments, one is average in size, and two are large. 
Id. 
 126. See id. at 141 (noting that “17.6% of the women and only 9.6% of the men report 
never volunteering in class; however 44.3% of the men and only 32.1% of the women report 
voluntary participation on a weekly basis. Infrequent participation was reported by 50.3% of 
female and 46.1% of male respondents”). 
 127. Id. at 142. 
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insecure or because they were uncertain about the merits of their 
question or comment.128 However, more men than women did not 
volunteer because they were not prepared for class or disagreed with 
the professor.129 
b. Attitude of professor and classroom participation. Banks I also 
concluded that while most men and women believed that professors 
neither encourage nor discourage questions or comments, signifi-
cantly more men than women believed professors respect other stu-
dents’ opinions.130 Nevertheless, over half of both men and women 
believed that professors belittle or embarrass students, and, while 
more women than men said that the professor’s sex makes a differ-
ence in the belittlement of students, a majority of both sexes believed 
that sex “makes no difference in this area.”131 
c. Sex of professor and classroom participation. Banks I also found 
that “[a]lmost twice as many women (12.9%) as men (7.2%) believed 
that the sex of the professor makes a difference in the frequency with 
which they are called on in class.”132 Moreover, “significantly more 
women (11.0%) than men (5.8%) believed the sex of the professor 
affects their voluntary class participation.”133 
d. Offensive humor and comments by professors. Finally, Banks I 
found that “forty-seven percent of those surveyed reported that one 
or more of their professors used offensive humor,” most of which 
was sexist in nature.134                                                                       
5. The second Banks study (“Banks II”): 1990 
The second Banks study was published two years after Banks I 
and consisted of 1930 responses from first- through third-year stu-
dents (sixty percent male, forty percent female) attending fourteen 
different law schools all across the country.135 
 
 128. See id. 
 129. See id. 
 130. See id. at 142–43. 
 131. Id. at 143. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 144. Banks did not define “sexist” but did note that while most students did 
not feel that “the sex of the professor [made a] difference in the frequency of use of offensive 
humor[,] [s]ignificantly more women (31.5%) than men (15.1%) said that the sex of the pro-
fessor does make a difference in the use of offensive humor.” Id. at 145. 
 135. See Banks II, supra note 84, at 528. 
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a. Classroom participation. Banks II reaffirmed the findings in 
Banks I that women report less voluntary participation than men and 
that women’s “level of voluntary class participation decreases over 
time.”136 Even more interesting, “[t]he women who report voluntary 
participation most in the first year are the ones who speak least by 
the third year.”137 Banks provided at least some support for the no-
tion that nonparticipation is an affirmative choice by women who 
subscribe to the counter-code theory expressed in the Berkeley 
study: “Repeatedly the women we interviewed last spring said: ‘The 
classroom environment is not supportive. It is very competitive. I 
find it alienating. I refuse to participate in this cannibalistic kind of 
process.’”138 
b. Discouraging behavior by professors. Banks II also confirmed the 
finding in Banks I that some professors continue to make offensive 
comments in the classroom, the overwhelming majority of which are 
sexist comments.139 
6. The Ohio study: 1994 
The Ohio study, commissioned by the Joint Task Force (of the 
Ohio Supreme Court and the Ohio State Bar Association) on Gen-
der Fairness in the Profession in 1991, surveyed 1896 students (800 
male, 800 female, 296 females with minority backgrounds)140 and 
169 teachers (39 women and 130 men)141 who attended or taught at 
one of Ohio’s law schools. 
a. Classroom participation. With respect to classroom participa-
tion, the Ohio study found that “[f]ewer women than men report 
they participate in class, and fewer women than men believe that the 
Socratic method allows a free discussion of ideas (by 15 percentage 
points in both instances).”142 The study itself “did not attempt to 
 
 136. Id. at 530. 
 137. Id. at 531. 
 138. Id. at 534. 
 139. See id at 531. 
 140. See Joan M. Krauskopf, Touching the Elephant: Perceptions of Gender Issues in Nine 
Law Schools, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311, 321–222 (1994). 
 141. See id at 328–29. 
 142. Id. at 314. For purposes of the survey, the Socratic method was defined as an ‘“in-
teractive teaching style where the professor repeatedly asks questions and students answer.’” 
Id. at 326. 
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draw cause-and-effect conclusions based on its findings;”143 however, 
the study’s author suggested that the cause of the differential class 
participation 
may be that more women than men are aware that the Socratic 
teaching method is designed to lead students to the teacher’s view 
rather than to their own conclusions. This growing awareness could 
be a benign explanation why participation rates for both men and 
women decline during law school, or nonparticipation could be re-
sistance to perceived narrow-mindedness [citing to the Berkeley 
study]. Acknowledgment of why the technique is used, or changes 
in the manner of using question-and-answer teaching, may increase 
meaningful student-faculty interchange in class.144 
b. Professors’ biases. The Ohio study also collected data regarding 
perceived professor sexual bias. The results of this data indicated that 
“[e]ighteen percent of females and of minority females—but only 2 
percent of males—feel that teachers value their ideas less because of 
their gender.”145 Forty-one percent of females—compared to only 
16.5 percent of males—felt less intelligent and articulate after enter-
ing law school than they had prior to entering law school.146 
7. The University of Pennsylvania study (“Penn study”): 1994 
The results of the Penn study were published in the same year as 
the Ohio study. The database for the Penn study is described as fol-
lows: “Our database draws from students enrolled at the [University 
of Pennsylvania] Law School between 1987 and 1992, and includes 
academic performance data from 981 students, self-reported survey 
data from 366 students, written narratives from 104 students, and 
group-level interview data of approximately eighty female and male 
students.”147 The Penn study purported to make four distinct find-
ings, one of which was that “many women are alienated by the way 
the Socratic method is used in large classroom instruction . . . .”148 
 
 143. Id. at 331. 
 144. Id. at 334–35. 
 145. Id. at 326. 
 146. See id. at 328. 
 147. Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women’s Experiences at One Ivy League 
Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1994). 
 148. Id. at 3. The other findings were (1) “strong academic differences [exist] between 
graduating men and women,” (2) “strong attitudinal differences [exist] between women and 
men in year one, and yet a striking homogenization by year three,” and (3) “substantial mate-
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a. Classroom participation. The Penn study did not ask how 
much students participated in class; rather, it asked “Are you com-
fortable with your level of voluntary participation in class?” Of first-
year respondents, the answer was that only twenty-eight percent of 
the female respondents answered yes, versus sixty-eight percent of 
the male respondents.149 By the third year, however, the numbers 
were much closer, with sixty-four percent of women responding yes, 
as compared to seventy-two percent of men.150 
b. Results of Socratic teaching. In summarizing the narrative data 
received in the survey regarding the Socratic method, the Penn study 
indicated that when the Socratic method is used to “intimidate or to 
establish a hierarchy within large classes,” many women reported 
feeling that speaking required a “performance.”151 Such perform-
ances included an added measure of pressure for female students, 
who sometimes felt they were expected to be a spokesperson for 
their gender group.152 Rather than participating under such pressure, 
the study reported that many simply “responded with silence.”153 
The study also documented that “[s]everal women who de-
scribed Socratic-style questioning as intimidating stated matter-of-
factly that they could not learn in an intimidating environment. . . . 
A few men also reported discomfort with the Socratic style, although 
they seemed less permanently disabled by it.”154 In addition, the 
study indicated that those students who resist the competitive, adver-
sarial law student stereotype “experience much dissonance.”155 
In its analysis of the findings regarding the Socratic method, the 
Penn study stated: 
[M]any women claim that neither their initiative nor their prob-
lem-solving ability is engaged in an intimidating learning environ-
ment. The performance aspect of a large Socratic classroom disables 
some women from performing up to their potential. Socratic teach-
ing, if designed to intimidate, adds more women to this category. 
 
rial consequences [await] women who exit the Law School after sustaining what they describe 
as a crisis of identity.” Id. at 3, 5. 
 149. Id. at 36. 
 150. See id. 
 151. Id. at 46. 
 152. See id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 46–47. 
 155. Id. at 47. 
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If no comparably significant formal learning experiences, other than 
large classroom Socratic teaching, are provided, first-year women in 
particular are most likely to be affected. These phenomena also ad-
versely affect some men.156 
In sum, “some women are disengaged from law school because they 
find its adversarial nature, its focus on argumentation, and its empha-
sis on abstract as opposed to contextual reasoning to be unappealing 
and disengaging.”157 
Despite its findings and analysis, however, the Penn study did 
not call for the abolition of the Socratic method.158 Rather, the study 
recommended “an effort to promote a genuine diversity of construc-
tive teaching styles, including, of course, rigorous Socratic teach-
ing.”159 The study posited that the implementation, for example, of 
group projects (a “less hierarchical alternative” to the Socratic 
method) might “minimize the alienation . . . [and] encourage broad-
based participation from those who feel disinclined to ‘perform’ 
when they speak but nevertheless have something to contrib-
ute . . . .”160 
8. The LSAC study: 1996 
The most recent study on women’s experiences in legal educa-
tion is the 1996 study commissioned by the Law School Admissions 
Council (“LSAC”). The LSAC study is a great addition to the body 
of research on gender issues in legal education because, unlike its 
predecessors, whose “studies have had limited impact as a conse-
quence of their small sample sizes, the sample bias that often results 
from self-selection of the sample, or their reliance on anecdotal evi-
dence,” 161 the LSAC study included a base sample of approximately 
29,000 students from 163 law schools who entered a law school J.D. 
program in fall 1991.162 
 
 
 156. Id. at 63. 
 157. Id. at 65. 
 158. See id. at 93. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 94. 
 161. LINDA F. WIGHTMAN, WOMEN IN LEGAL EDUCATION: A COMPARISON OF THE 
LAW SCHOOL PERFORMANCE AND LAW SCHOOL EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN AND MEN 1 
(1996). 
 162. See id. at 5. 
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a. Caveat. Despite its large study sample, the results of the LSAC 
study are subject to a significant limitation. As a general caveat to its 
findings, the LSAC study noted that “[a]n important qualification 
here is that these ratings are not absolute, but relative to expecta-
tions. In other words, these data do not suggest that women found 
the law school environment as supportive as men found it, but rather 
that each group found it as supportive as they expected it to be.”163 
Nevertheless, information regarding students’ expectations is valu-
able in studying the effectiveness of law school pedagogy. 
b. Quality of instruction. In response to questions regarding the 
quality of instruction in law school, “[w]hite women rated the qual-
ity of instruction in first-year law school classes significantly lower 
than expected” compared to the quality of instruction expected by 
their male counterparts.164 However, on a related question, the study 
did not find any significant gender differences among respondents 
with respect to their “evaluation[s] of the law school environment 
relative to their expectations.”165 Moreover, “[b]oth women and 
men reported that the faculty were slightly more accessible than they 
had expected and that the environment was about as supportive as 
expected.”166 
c. Characteristics of professors. Study respondents were also asked 
to estimate the number of their first-year instructors who possessed a 
variety of characteristics including the following: (1) friendly to stu-
dents, (2) available to students outside of class, (3) open-minded, (4) 
clear on what they expect from students, (5) generally supportive, 
and (6) concerned about the problems of minorities and disadvan-
taged students.167 
Women identified significantly fewer professors who were con-
cerned about the problems of minorities and disadvantaged students 
than did men.168 In addition, the survey results “showed a practically 
significant difference between women and men [in] the number of 
 
 163. Id. at 72. 
 164. Id. at 40. The study did not provide statistics on this issue for women in general but 
broke it down more discreetly into a race-gender analysis. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See id. at 49–50. Other characteristics included: (1) interested in teaching; (2) 
knowledgeable about the subjects they teach; (3) concerned with issues of justice; (4) con-
cerned with issues of professional ethics; (5) cynical about the quality of practicing lawyers; and 
(6) cynical about the quality of the judiciary. See id. 
 168. See id. at 51. 
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first-year instructors who were ‘generally supportive.’”169 The data 
also did not “contradict findings reported in the literature that 
women law students tend to find few if any faculty who[m] they 
consider to be open-minded, clear in their expectations, or generally 
supportive.”170 Nevertheless, the data revealed that men also identi-
fied relatively few first-year professors with such characteristics.171 
d. Competitiveness, public speaking ability, confidence. The LSAC 
study also queried whether a gender differential existed with respect 
to self-concept in law students after completing the first year.172 In 
this area, “students were asked to compare themselves with their 
classmates on . . . traits such as academic ability, competitiveness, 
public speaking ability, and self-confidence in academic situa-
tions . . . .”173 In these areas, “overall men rated themselves signifi-
cantly higher than women in all areas . . . .”174 The study also indi-
cated that the same differential ratings existed prior to entering law 
school—even “when women’s academic performance records sub-
stantially exceeded the records of their male peers.”175 Along these 
lines, the study also reported that both men and women “reduced 
their self-ratings in every category following their first year . . . . 
[Thus,] [t]hese data suggest that the negative impact on self-
confidence attributed to law school operates equally on women and 
men . . . .”176 
e. Effectiveness of Socratic method. The LSAC also attempted to 
determine the validity of the suggestion in “previous research . . . 
that the Socratic method of teaching is more problematic for women 
than for men.”177 The study hypothesized, based on this assumption, 
that “women who did worse” than predicted in law school “had a 
larger percentage of their classes taught using the Socratic  
 
 
 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See id. 
 172. See id. at 53. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 55. 
 176. Id. at 58. 
 177. Id. at 99. 
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method.”178 The results, however, failed to support this hypothe-
sis.179 On the other hand, “Women who performed worse than ex-
pected had a substantially more negative impression of the attributes 
of their law school instructors than did women who performed bet-
ter.”180 
C. Summary of Study Results 
1. Classroom participation 
If nothing else is clear from the studies, it is virtually undeniable 
that there is in fact a gender-based discrepancy in the amount of 
classroom participation between men and women law students. 
Every study addressing the issue has confirmed this result, regardless 
of the demographic makeup of the sample. 
The more interesting point has to do with the reasons proffered 
for the discrepancy. At least four theories have emerged. First, as the 
Yale and Stanford studies suggest, fear may be the primary reason for 
women’s nonparticipation. The Berkeley study takes issue with this 
characterization and rejects the “faint-hearted female” rationale. 
Nevertheless, the data from the Banks I study provides support for 
the fear rationale in that it documented that more women than men 
fail to participate because they feel insecure or are uncertain about 
the merits of their comment or question. 
A second possible reason for women’s failure to participate is the 
simple suggestion of professor bias—i.e., the professor, consciously 
or not, calls on male students more often than on female students. 
The Stanford study tends to support this characterization. 
A third possible reason for women’s silence in the classroom is, 
as suggested in the Stanford study, women, although perfectly com-
fortable speaking in class, simply have little interest in dominating 
the classroom discussion. One commentator, who seemed to espouse 
this rationale, noted that 
[i]nstructors should not assume too quickly . . . that silence neces-
sarily leads to educational deprivation. When queried to address the 
question of differential participation patterns among male and fe-
 
 178. Id. 
 179. See id. 
 180. Id. 
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male students in law school courses in general, one woman . . . re-
sponded to the following effect: “Don’t worry about us. We’re lis-
tening. We dominate law review, class ranking, and advocacy com-
petition awards. It won’t necessarily help us to be talking all the 
time.” This student recognized both the value of developing her 
ability to listen and the false progress represented by glib students, 
mostly male, who were inclined to interrupt the statements of oth-
ers without first absorbing their messages.181 
A fourth explanation for women’s nonparticipation is the posi-
tion taken by the Berkeley study that women’s silence indicates a 
counter-code of classroom ethics—i.e., a form of individual protest 
against the narrow analytical perspectives valued in the law school 
classroom. However, the finding in the Penn study that less than 
one-third of the female respondents participated as much as they 
wanted to in their first year may indicate that their silence was not a 
positive act of rebellion against the system. On the other hand, the 
fact that the women in the Penn study seemed to become more satis-
fied as they progressed through law school, combined with the data 
from Banks I and II that women participate less and less in their sec-
ond and third years, may indicate that women simply adopt the 
counter-code at a later stage of their legal education. 
2. Professor conduct 
A second characteristic of the research regarding gender differen-
tials in law school classrooms has to do with the professors them-
selves—or more precisely, student perceptions of professors. Four 
particular areas of professor conduct were considered. 
First, the Berkeley and the LSAC studies considered student per-
ceptions of the traits professors possess. The Berkeley study found no 
gender differences in terms of what characteristics students admire 
most in their professors; it did, however, find a discrepancy among 
the graduates surveyed. The discrepancy indicated that more male 
graduates admired professors adept at Socratic teaching, while female 
graduates admired professors who were open to questions after class. 
The LSAC study, on the other hand, indicated that women found 
professors more often to be lacking the quality of being “generally 
supportive.” 
 
 181. Charles R. Calleros, Training a Diverse Student Body for a Multicultural Society, 8 
LA RAZA L.J. 140, 159 (1995). 
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Second, Banks I and the Ohio study considered the gender-
impact differential relating to the attitude of professors. Banks I 
showed that women were significantly less likely to believe that pro-
fessors have respect for other students’ opinions. Moreover, the 
Ohio study indicated that a significantly larger proportion of women 
than men felt that professors valued their ideas less because of their 
gender. 
Third, the Banks I and II studies considered the language of pro-
fessors a source of the differential experience of law students along 
gender lines. Both studies indicated that a surprisingly large number 
of law professors use offensive humor in their classrooms. Moreover, 
most of the foul humor is sexist in nature. It would not be difficult 
to imagine how such an environment would silence and disadvantage 
women in particular. 
Fourth, both the Berkeley and the Banks I studies gathered data 
relating to the relevance of a professor’s gender. In Berkeley, while 
men found no difference between male and female professors from 
the standpoint of classroom comfort and participation, women ex-
pressed an emphatic comfort preference in favor of female professors, 
and almost half said they would be more likely to speak in a class 
taught by a woman professor. The results in the Berkeley study were 
mirrored in the Banks I study, which also found that female students 
considered the sex of the professor important in determining how 
often they were called on and how often they volunteered. 
3. Limiting factors 
For purposes of the present analysis, one of the central problems 
with the existing studies is establishing a cause-effect relationship be-
tween the study results and the Socratic method. Only four of the 
studies (Yale, Berkeley, Ohio, and Penn) drew specific links to the 
Socratic method. Of those four, only the Penn study devoted signifi-
cant analysis to the study’s implications for Socratic teaching. More-
over, the negative implications described in the Penn study were 
largely limited to those situations in which the Socratic method is 
specifically employed to “intimidate” students. 
Despite the absence of a clear cause and effect relationship in the 
studies between women’s silence, professors’ conduct, and the So-
cratic method, it seems reasonable to assume that such key elements 
of classroom dynamics would be a reflection of the dominant teach-
ing methodology employed in those classrooms. On the other hand, 
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while this may be true, not all of the studies distinguished between 
classrooms in which the Socratic method was employed and class-
rooms in which other methodologies were employed. Such “loop-
holes” provide fertile soil for further study. Thus, while a conclusive 
cause-effect relationship remains somewhat elusive, the anecdotal 
evidence and available statistical data support an inference that the 
traditional Socratic method of legal pedagogy is at least partially re-
sponsible for negative experiences of women in legal education. This 
inference provides the basis for the further analysis set forth in the 
sections that follow. 
D. Feminist Theories 
Assuming that causation can be established between levels of 
classroom participation, professor conduct, and Socratic teaching, 
the differential experiences of women in the Socratic classroom can 
be interpreted through the lenses of various feminist theories. 
1. Difference theory 
Feminist critiques of law school and the Socratic method are 
based upon the assumption that women experience law school dif-
ferently than men and that the different voices women bring are 
something that should be valued as a viable source of reform in legal 
education.182 As this is the fundamental tenet of difference theory, it 
is not surprising that many of the studies discuss the work of Carol 
Gilligan, the most prolific advocate of difference theory, and the 
fundamental values of difference theory as a framework within which 
to criticize the current system of legal education.183 
The Ohio study succinctly describes the argument against the 
Socratic method from a difference theory standpoint: 
The relationship-oriented person values the preservation of social 
relationships, is agreeable and nonassertive in manner, is inclined 
toward nurturing and caring, and is sensitive to context and to the 
emotions of others. Contrary qualities characterize the rights-
oriented person, who acts assertive, argumentative, confrontational, 
controlling, and impersonal; this person is unemotional, logical, 
 
 182. See, e.g., Weiss & Melling, supra note 93, at 1300–01. 
 183. See id. at 1302–10; see also Guinier et al., supra note 147, at 15–18; Homer & 
Schwartz, supra note 114, at 18–19; Krauskopf, supra note 140, at 317; Taber et al., supra 
note 86, at 1212–18. 
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and abstract in reasoning, and values the application of rules to es-
tablish and protect “rights.” The literature points out that these are 
the characteristics of the traditional Socratic method and of the le-
gal system itself.184 
I take issue with this characterization, at least as a matter of 
methodological constraint. Certainly, the Socratic method is capable 
of being (and “traditionally” may actually have been) employed in a 
way that emphasizes a rights-oriented bent, but the method itself 
does not require such an orientation. Moreover, the extent to which 
the Socratic method is rights-oriented suggests the need for reform. 
Thus, the difference theory critique is directed more at the applica-
tion of the Socratic method than at the method itself. Such criticisms 
are valid, but they can be dealt with by adjusting the application of 
the Socratic method rather than abandoning it outright. At least one 
feminist scholar has suggested a number of ways in which an ethic of 
care can be infused into the Socratic method.185 I agree with this 
suggestion and explore it in depth in Parts V.C–D. 
2. Dominance theory 
In addition to considering the implications of difference theory, 
many of the studies counterbalanced Gilligan’s basic difference 
premises with the dominance theory advocated by Catharine 
MacKinnon.186 The aim of dominance theory is 
neither to reconstruct and celebrate the voices of women, nor to 
teach women to think, talk, and act more like men, but to expose 
and combat the worst forms of violence against women . . .[—]to 
free women to define and control themselves and their world:  
‘[t]he question is not so much how to make rules fit reality, but 
rather how to change reality.’187 
 
 
 184. Krauskopf, supra note 140, at 316 (footnotes omitted). 
 185. Rosato, supra note 12, at 59–62 (discussing specific ways in which professors can 
foster an ethic of care in a Socratic classroom). 
 186. See Weiss & Melling, supra note 93, at 1302–10; Guinier et al., supra note 147, at 
15–18; Homer & Schwartz, supra note 114, at 18–19; Krauskopf, supra note 140, at 317; 
Taber et al., supra note 86, at 1212–18. 
 187. Weiss & Melling, supra note 93, at 1308–09 (quoting Catharine MacKinnon, 
Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law: A Conversation, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 11, 25 
(1985)). 
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As such, dominance theorists would counsel the abandonment of the 
Socratic method—a method created and perpetuated by a male-
dominated legal hierarchy. 
In discussing various responses to MacKinnon’s dominance the-
ory, one commentator has said, “Some people have a flash of recog-
nition when reading MacKinnon, others feel she is describing a 
world that does not exist.”188 At least with respect to Socratic teach-
ing in law school, I fall into the latter category. As I see it, the prob-
lem with dominance theory is that its vehemence is a means without 
an end, or rather an end in itself. In other words, after all its criti-
cisms, one is left wondering what should be done. In the law school 
environment, (barring segregated law schools)189 men and women 
have to work together. This being so, a purely “feminist” methodol-
ogy or a purely “masculine” methodology cannot be viable—some 
“splicing” of the two must take place. Thus, I reject the extremism 
of dominance theory as failing to proffer a viable solution to the 
practical necessities of legal education in the real world. 
3. Formal equality 
Although not discussed by name in feminist critiques of the So-
cratic method, the principles of formal equality also have a bearing 
on the validity of the Socratic method. Those who subscribe to for-
mal equality notions would not necessarily call for the abandonment 
of the Socratic method but would rather demand that it treat women 
and men equally. With respect to the study results explored above, 
this would mean that gender-based discrimination in the application 
of the method should be eliminated. Thus, women should have the 
opportunity to be called on as often as men; their comments should 
not be ignored or devalued (as for example when they are recog-
nized only when a man makes the same point) and; professors should 
not “throw them softballs” or have “ladies’ day”190 or call on women 
only when issues such as rape or domestic violence are being dis-
cussed. In addition, sexist language and behavior should be abol-
ished in the classroom, whether its source be professors or students. 
 
 
 188. EVA H. HANKS ET AL., ELEMENTS OF LAW 637 (1994). 
 189. Of course, even if effective in law school, this would only delay the general problem. 
 190. James R. Elkins, On the Significance of Women in Legal Education, 7 AM. LEGAL 
STUD. A.F. 291, 302 (1983). 
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In essence, the formal equality advocate demands that the proce-
dural barriers erected upon gender-based discrimination be elimi-
nated so that women are treated no better or worse than men. In re-
sponse, I believe that the tenets of formal equality factor strongly 
into the revised Socratic method, which I propose below. The “pro-
cedural accommodations” in Part V.C are intended in large part to 
address the concerns of formal equality theory. 
4. Substantive equality 
Substantive equality is likewise absent (in name) in the studies 
and literature regarding the Socratic method. Yet, again, its presence 
can be detected in the reforms suggested by feminist commentators. 
The Ohio study states the substantive equality argument: “[B]ecause 
women have been socialized to become homemakers and not profes-
sionals, they actually require more encouragement than men in a 
male-dominated profession in order to receive an equal education; if 
neither male nor female students are encouraged, women effectively 
suffer discrimination.”191 
Based on the findings of the Banks I and Berkeley studies that 
women considered the sex of the professor important in determining 
how often they were called on and how often they volunteered, sub-
stantive equality would call for the hiring of more female professors. 
Indeed, such suggestions have been and continue to be made.192 
Other substantive equality reforms might include actually calling on 
more women than men in class to compensate for the traditional ab-
sence of women’s voices in law school classrooms. In addition, law 
schools might institute support programs targeted at helping female 
law students succeed. 
The suggestions emanating from substantive equality theory for 
improving the Socratic classroom are also valid and deserve serious 
consideration. Despite this, many worry that implementing substan-
tive equality reforms may end up reinforcing the very stereotypes 
women wish to dispel.193 Moreover, as discussed below, I believe 
 
 191. Krauskopf, supra note 140, at 317. 
 192. See ABA COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, supra note 16, at 44. This 
call for hiring a more diverse faculty has been strenuously endorsed even though “a commit-
ment to diversity cannot be satisfied simply by hiring women and minorities in numbers pro-
portionate to their availability in the market . . . .” Id. 
 193. See infra Part V.A.3. 
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that most, if not all, of the substantive equality criticisms can be ac-
commodated without abandoning the Socratic method. 
V. KEEP THE BABY; TOSS THE BATHWATER: AN IMPROVED 
SOCRATIC METHOD THAT HUMANIZES LEGAL EDUCATION FOR 
BOTH MEN AND WOMEN 
“Though we can abbreviate the Socratic Method SM, it should not be 
sadistic for instructors or masochistic for students.”194 
The fundamental question arising from the feminist research 
with respect to the Socratic method is whether the method is com-
patible with the educational needs of female law students. Some of 
the studies discussed above have answered the question with an em-
phatic no. Others have argued that it is women, not legal education, 
that must change. The most viable alternative, however, lies between 
these two extremes. 
In this section, I argue that, despite feminist criticisms leveled 
against it, the Socratic method deserves a continued place in legal 
pedagogy. Nevertheless, many of the criticisms are valid, and, thus, 
certain accommodations, as well as fundamental changes, should be 
implemented to counteract the negative effects traditionally attrib-
uted to Socratic teaching. Such an approach attempts “to relieve the 
oppressive atmosphere of the Socratic method . . . without compro-
mising the intensity of the intellectual inquiry which, after all is said 
and done, is the legitimate justification of Socratic teaching.”195 
Moreover, the modifications suggested are not intended to “lower 
the bar” for women who otherwise could not “make it.” Rather, the 
modifications are aimed at “humanizing” the Socratic method for 
the benefit of both men and women. This is more than a token ges-
ture since the studies reveal that, as currently practiced, the Socratic 
method has had a negative impact on men as well as on women.196 
 
 194. Areeda, supra note 65, at 918. 
 195. Stone, supra note 5, at 418. 
 196. See Banks I, supra note 124, at 141 (“[T]he classroom environment may be hostile 
to most law students, although more so for women than men.”); Banks II, supra note 84, at 
530 (“I talk to a lot of men from working class backgrounds who feel just as alienated by this 
androcentric, upper-middle class environment as women. . . .”); Guinier et al., supra note 147, 
at 63 (“These phenomena also adversely affect[ed] some men.”); Krauskopf, supra note 140, 
at 317 (“[L]aw school teaching techniques and classroom environment may contribute to si-
lencing both men and women.”). 
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Part V.A discusses some of the practical reasons for keeping the 
Socratic method as a valuable tool of legal pedagogy. Part V.B intro-
duces a two-part framework for effectuating humanizing reforms in 
Socratic teaching. Part V.C explores part one of the framework, de-
scribing some important “procedural changes”—i.e., changes in the 
manner in which the Socratic method is employed—which should be 
implemented in order to humanize the Socratic method. Part V.D 
discusses part two of the framework, outlining important “substan-
tive changes”—i.e., changes to the fundamental conception of the 
Socratic method as it is now largely practiced—that will bring the 
Socratic method into conformity with the method employed by its 
namesake (Socrates) and, in the process, implement humanizing 
principles derived from feminist theory. Finally, Part V.E recognizes 
both the pedagogical limitations of Socratic teaching and the value 
of employing diverse teaching methodologies. 
A. Justifications for Keeping the Socratic Method Despite Feminist 
Criticisms 
Three categories of justifications support the continued use of 
the Socratic method in legal education: (1) basic skills training, (2) 
institutional limitations, and (3) avoidance of stereotyped roles. 
1. Basic skills training 
Most critics of the Socratic method—even many feminist crit-
ics—are willing to concede that “Socratic exchange can cultivate 
skills that are valuable in certain professional contexts . . . .”197 In-
deed, 
[s]peaking in public, whether it be in the courtroom, before a 
group of clients or opposing counsel, or in a meeting of lawmakers 
working to draft a statute, is part of every lawyer’s job, so develop-
ing the ability to present ideas forcefully and effectively in such 
contexts is integral to becoming a lawyer.198 
 
 197. Rhode, supra note 57, at 1557; see also supra notes 156–57 and accompanying text. 
 198. Garrett, supra note 42, at 202. A similar sentiment was expressed by another female 
law professor: 
Part of the methodology of law school education, particularly in the first year where 
many professors call on students who do not volunteer, is to emphasize and give 
practice in speaking. This is justified on the grounds that so much of the legal pro-
fession involves speaking. We need to be very concerned about the fact that if we, as 
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Moreover, even if students do not intend to litigate, they will be 
called upon to “present ideas to groups, defend those ideas, and 
propose solutions to legal problems.” 199 The opportunity to develop 
such skills through Socratic dialogue in the “relatively safe” envi-
ronment of the classroom is invaluable.200 Thus, at a bare minimum, 
the Socratic method “‘drills’ a method of inquiry that forms the 
foundation [for] more sophisticated legal thinking.”201 Furthermore, 
due to the “relatively safe” environment of the law school, 
[t]he training provided by the Socratic Method may . . . be most 
important for students who experience the most discomfort when 
they are asked to engage in this form of legal discourse. In an at-
mosphere of relatively low stakes, these students have the chance to 
develop their analytical and oral advocacy skills. 202 
2. Institutional concerns 
The second justification for maintaining the Socratic method—
i.e., institutional concerns—covers two basic issues: economic con-
cerns and timing concerns. 
First, one of the valuable characteristics of the Socratic method is 
the ability of professors to use it in large classes, thus encouraging 
economic efficiency. Unfortunately, many of the alternative feminist 
methodologies, which are intended to encourage more cooperative 
learning, would require substantial reductions in student-teacher ra-
tios—a proposition that would have “economic ramifications.”203 
Thus, the practical exigencies at most law schools favor maintaining 
the Socratic method. Though this is certainly not the most noble 
reason for keeping the Socratic method, it will remain persuasive as 
long as money talks and law schools listen. 
Second, “the primary obligation that [law professors] have to 
[their] students is to prepare them with the skills and values neces-
sary to enter the practice of law in the 1990s [i.e., the current time 
 
women, speak less, then we are also failing to take advantage of the opportunity to 
train ourselves in the skills of our profession. 
Banks II, supra note 84, at 538 (Jill E. Adams responding to Banks’ study results). 
 199. Garrett, supra note 42, at 204. 
 200. See id. 
 201. Rosato, supra note 12, at 45. 
 202. Garrett, supra note 42, at 204. 
 203. Id. at 208. 
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period].”204 Thus, although the long term goal may be to seek a 
“less male-dominated, less adversarial system of justice,” legal educa-
tors “must assist [students] in understanding the adversarial system 
and in playing the role of lawyers within that system.”205 This entails 
learning the fundamental skills of legal analysis—skills that the So-
cratic method is ostensibly designed to develop.206 
3. Avoidance of stereotypes 
A third concern favoring retention of the Socratic method in-
volves gender stereotyping. Many women have expressed fears that 
the abandonment of the Socratic method would only give credence 
to stereotypes, suggesting that “women law students cannot with-
stand the rigors of the Socratic Method and thus do not belong in 
the law school classroom, the courtroom or the boardroom.”207 The 
import of this common rebuttal to substantive equality and differ-
ence theory arguments is poignantly expressed in the following justi-
fication for maintaining the Socratic method: 
If you were lucky enough to be a dominant group and wanted to 
dominate society, . . . how would you construct a perfect subordi-
nate group? Well, I think that you would make them cooperative,  
empathetic, nurturing of others, self-sacrificing, noncompetitive, 
and nonaggressive.208 
 
 204. Rosato, supra note 12, at 51. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Moreover, “[i]f we abandon the Socratic Method, it probably will have little impact 
on the adversarial system as a whole, but will result in students being ill-prepared to work 
within it because they will not have gained the foundational knowledge they need.” Id. at 52. 
 207. Id. at 39; see also id. at 58 (“[T]he Socratic Method should not be circumscribed 
simply to accommodate women. To do so only patronizes women law students and reinforces 
the view still held by some that women do not belong in law school or the legal profession—or 
at least not at the highest levels of achievement.” (footnotes omitted)). Others have been more 
forceful in making this point: 
I would like to know when these bellyachers [feminist critics of the Socratic 
method] will throw off the cloak of victimization and concentrate on good lawyer-
ing. True, the Socratic method is often adversarial and intimidating. Like it or not, 
“ritualized combat” is excellent preparation for the real world. . . . [Studies calling 
for the abandonment of the Socratic method] do women attorneys a great disservice 
by encouraging them to blame others for their lack of success. 
Neary, supra note 16, at 10 (letter to the editor in response to the University of Pennsylvania 
study). 
 208. Margaret Jane Radin, Reply: Please Be Careful with Cultural Feminism, 45 STAN. L. 
REV. 1567, 1568 (1993). 
7GAR-FIN.DOC 12/9/00  1:41 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000 
1638 
Thus, abandoning the Socratic method in favor of these methods, 
which supposedly cater more to women’s values, may end up rein-
forcing the exact stereotypes feminist critics are attempting to dispel. 
This justification for maintaining the Socratic method may sim-
ply be the choice of the lesser of two evils. On the other hand, com-
mentators advocating this rationale do not view this as an abandon-
ment of women’s traditional values. Rather, the suggestion is that 
women law students can become “multilingual” through the So-
cratic method—i.e., women can learn the additional language of 
“standard legal discourse” through Socratic methods while maintain-
ing fluency in the “language of the oppressed.”209 
B. A Socratic Method with “New Hands” and a “New Heart” 
“It would be ironic and wonderful if the Socratic method, a tool that 
has been used for so long to shore up an edifice of privilege and oppres-
sion, could also be used, in new hands and with a new heart, to build 
a better future.”210 
Having concluded that the Socratic method should be salvaged, 
I now shift attention to what changes should be made in order to ac-
commodate negative criticisms of the Socratic method and, in effect, 
give Socratic teaching “new hands” and a “new heart.” The chal-
lenge in reconstructing such an “improved” Socratic method is to 
avoid doing so in a manner that effectively calls for an “add women 
and stir” approach.211 Clearly, a Socratic method that satisfies 
women’s concerns would “focus on transforming social institutions, 
not just assimilating women within them.”212 Nevertheless, I do not 
believe that transformation and assimilation are mutually exclusive 
remedies. Rather, as the “hands” and “heart” metaphor suggests, an 
effective solution to the criticisms of the Socratic method requires 
efforts in both assimilation and transformation. Thus, Part V.C (enti-
tled “procedural accommodations”) addresses assimilation issues,  
 
 
 209. Rosato, supra note 12, at 55–59 (“[T]he realities of the existing male-oriented legal 
discourse need to be recognized. Many lawyers and judges speak the primary language [i.e. 
standard legal discourse] almost exclusively and may not value or understand multiple lan-
guages.”). 
 210. Williams, supra note 11, at 1576. 
 211. Rhode, supra note 57, at 1564. 
 212. Id. at 1551. 
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while Part V.D (entitled “substantive changes”) addresses transfor-
mation issues. 
C. Procedural Accommodations: “New Hands” 
This section explores two ways the assimilation aspect of Socratic 
reform can be addressed: (1) by recognizing the role of the teacher 
and (2) by providing institutional support for teachers and students. 
I label these “procedural accommodations” since they do not reflect 
any inherent change to the substance of the Socratic method but 
rather emphasize various aspects of the application of the Socratic 
method. 
1. The vital role of the teacher 
The studies discussed above suggest that law professors can do 
much to eliminate, or at least mitigate, the differential classroom dy-
namics among men and women law students.213 The professor’s role 
in this arena is to remove obstacles that tend to inhibit student in-
volvement. These obstacles seem to come in three basic forms: (1) 
withdrawal caused by teacher abuse, (2) withdrawal caused by peer 
abuse, and (3) withdrawal caused by student self-doubt or other fac-
tors. 
a. Withdrawal caused by teacher abuse—distinguishing problems 
with the teacher from problems with the Socratic method. It is axiomatic 
that any pedagogical style will only be as effective as the teacher who 
employs it. Neither the Socratic method nor any other method will 
be successful without the conscientious application on the part of the 
professor. Thus, law professors wield enormous power in determin-
ing the extent to which the Socratic dialogue is effective or not. 
Even advocates of the Socratic method recognize that law profes-
sors can and sometimes do abuse the Socratic method by making 
sexist comments, ignoring comments of women students, disparag-
ing student answers, or being mean or rude in any number of other 
ways.214 Such conduct, however, is not an inherent attribute of So-
 
 213. As Banks noted, “A teacher’s behavior in the classroom can alienate students and 
impair learning.” Banks II, supra note 84, at 532. Conversely, I believe that a teacher’s behav-
ior can also do much to empower students and encourage learning. 
 214. See Garrett, supra note 42, at 203; see also Rosato, supra note 12, at 49–51. A num-
ber of the studies discussed above add credence to the existence of this problem. 
7GAR-FIN.DOC 12/9/00  1:41 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000 
1640 
cratic teaching.215 Rather, it is the abusive professor—not the So-
cratic method—that creates the hostility and sense of alienation re-
garding which female (and male) law students complain. Moreover, 
“[a] teacher with a penchant for disparaging students would do so 
regardless of the pedagogy used.”216 Therefore, abandoning the So-
cratic method would likely not address the more fundamental prob-
lem.217 Assuming a professor is not inherently abusive, she can—and 
indeed must—do many things to control the classroom environment 
in a way that promotes the effective use of Socratic teaching. Such 
things are discussed below. 
b. Withdrawal caused by peer abuse. Law professors must not tol-
erate student-on-student abuse. As many of the studies discussed 
above point out, a “common problem in the Socratic classroom is 
disrespectful treatment of students by their peers.”218 “[P]rofessors 
should require students to refrain from the rhetorical equivalent of 
street fighting and to articulate their views in the civil, intellectual 
terms that would be appropriate in a courtroom, legislative hearing, 
or public meeting.”219 Professors “should emphasize the difference 
between cruel and destructive behavior and genuine debate and dis-
agreement both by their example when they treat students with re-
 
 215. See Rosato, supra note 12, at 50. 
Humiliation and harassment are not inherent to the Socratic Method. The true So-
cratic teacher encourages students to think critically and does not disparage them if 
they fail to fulfill the teacher’s expectations. The true Socratic teacher also assures 
the students, in one way or another, that they are not expected to ‘win’ the ‘contest’ 
because it is stacked against them. 
Id. 
 216. Id.; see also Garrett, supra note 42, at 203. 
Professors who are intolerant of opposing perspectives, who are mean or rude to 
students, who abuse their power in order to intimidate students are bad teachers—
whether they engage students in a Socratic dialogue or use a lecture format. Perhaps 
the Socratic Method provides more opportunities for such abusive behavior because 
it demands constant interaction between professor and students. But a bad teacher 
who does not use the Socratic Method can be offensive during a lecture or dismiss-
ively rude to students when they ask questions.  
Id. 
 217. The question of how to deal with such abusive professors is a complicated matter. 
See Rosato, supra note 12, at 50. Inasmuch as it is a problem distinct from the Socratic 
method, discussion of its solution is beyond the scope of this Comment. Nevertheless, one 
commentator suggested that regular student and peer evaluations of such professors may be a 
step in the right direction. See Garrett, supra note 42, at 203. 
 218. Garrett, supra note 42, at 203 (referencing the Penn study). 
 219. Calleros, supra note 181, at 161. 
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spect and by their strong reaction to any unprofessional behavior ex-
hibited by students.”220 Moreover, such “childish behavior” should  
also be the subject of public condemnation by the institutional ad-
ministration.221 
c. Withdrawal caused by student self-doubt or other factors. Law 
professors can do a number of things to offset the classroom partici-
pation differential referred to in the studies between women and 
men law students.222 For example, to compensate for the docu-
mented fact that women tend to volunteer less readily than men, 
professors could rely less on volunteers and more on students upon 
whom they call.223 Moreover, teachers who employ the Socratic dia-
logue should make it a practice to alternate calling on male and fe-
male law students. In addition, teachers should talk about issues in 
detail with both men and women students to avoid the perception 
that women are being thrown “softballs” or are asked fewer ques-
tions.224 
In addition to evening out the participation playing field, law 
professors can do much to lessen the “performance” anxiety associ-
ated with Socratic dialogues by infusing an ethic of care in their So-
cratic dialogues. This can be accomplished by giving positive rein-
forcement to students whenever possible.225 “Tell[ing] students they 
have good answers and questions (when they actually do) and re-
fer[ring] to their insightful answers and questions in later discus-
sions” fosters an ethic of care in the classroom that would probably 
have particular appeal to women law students.226 Such positive rein-
forcement is enhanced when the teacher refers to the student by 
name when giving it.227 Teachers can also lessen participation anxiety 
 
 220. Garrett, supra note 42, at 203. 
 221. See id. (noting that “[d]uring the University of Chicago’s orientation panel on the 
Socratic Method, faculty members discuss the role of civility and tolerance in the law school 
classroom—a discussion that might be warranted regardless of the prevalent teaching 
method”). 
 222. The vital importance of encouraging students to participate was poignantly de-
scribed by one commentator, who stated, “We must find ways to encourage students to par-
ticipate in class, even if they are wrong. To me the worst thing is for a student not to know 
that she or he is on the wrong track until she or he gets the grade for the course.” Banks II, 
supra note 84, at 532–33. 
 223. See Garrett, supra note 42, at 204–05. 
 224. Id. at 205. 
 225. See Rosato, supra note 12, at 60. 
 226. Id. 
 227. See id. 
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by asking students to assist each other as “colleagues or co-
counsel”—just as they might do in the “real world.”228 In addition, 
teachers should try to remember to “come back to” students who 
were initially less than responsive to questions (thus, allowing them 
time to regain composure and focus on the issues at hand). Finally, 
in some circumstances, it might even be appropriate for the student 
to “be called into the teacher’s office so that the teacher can discuss 
her approach to class participation and can encourage the student to 
become more involved in class discussion.”229 This ethic-of-care ap-
proach to Socratic teaching would not only appeal to women law 
students but to any student who feels anxiety in the law school class-
room. 
Other suggestions for encouraging participation from students 
(particularly women and minorities) include: (1) “refer[ring] to di-
verse populations in our course materials, lectures, hypothetical ques-
tions, and written problems”230 so that a diverse student body can 
identify with the material at least some of the time; (2) refraining 
from interrupting students or allowing one’s “eyes to glaze over” 
when students comment; and (3) “debriefing” students after a dia-
logue by “discuss[ing] the objectives of the questioning . . . and how 
the objectives were (or were not) achieved . . .[by,] [f]or example, 
tell[ing] students what types of answers you sought and why.”231 
d. Summary. The discussion above makes clear that the effective-
ness of the Socratic method will, in large part, stand or fall based on 
the professor employing it. 
 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Calleros, supra note 181, at 150 (noting also that “[a] simple thing like including 
feminine pronouns and ethnic names in problems can begin to help students from diverse 
backgrounds feel represented and remind all students of the diversity of the society that is 
served”). 
 231. Rosato, supra note 12, at 62. Rosato here attempts to dispel the notion that “[a]s 
law teachers, we seem to think that debriefing would expose us as impostors, like the Wizard of 
Oz!” Id. Furthermore, the communication fostered between teacher and student engaged in 
such debriefing not only does much to “reduc[e] anxiety and isolation” but “help[s] students 
learn to understand that the Socratic Method does not exist simply to humiliate them unneces-
sarily. Eventually, students may understand that there is a method to the teacher’s madness.” 
Id. See also Stephanie M. Wildman, The Question of Silence: Techniques to Ensure Full Class 
Participation, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 147 (1988), for other ideas on encouraging classroom par-
ticipation from reluctant students. These ideas include convening a court in class, dividing up 
the large section and meeting with smaller groups on occasion, and using some creative role 
playing scenarios. See id. at 152–54. 
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Much, if not everything, depended and still depends upon the in-
structor and his [or her] capacity to arouse in the student an enthu-
siasm for the subject and a strong determination to get to the vitals 
of each problem, . . . . [N]o teaching is good which does not rouse 
and “dephlegmatize” the students, . . .—which does not engage as 
its allies, their awakened, sympathetic, and co-operating faculties.232 
Thus, the effectiveness of the Socratic method for all law students, 
but more particularly the disenfranchised ones, requires teachers who 
care enough about the education of their students and who are sensi-
tive enough to diversity and alienation issues that they will devote 
the extra effort necessary to make the Socratic classroom a hospitable 
learning environment for all. 
2. Institutional support for teachers and students 
Although caring, sensitive, and devoted teachers are the primary 
component of a feminist-friendly Socratic method, law schools as 
institutions can and should do more to alleviate the differential 
impact of Socratic teaching on women law students. 
First, the law school should make pedagogical potential (rather 
than strictly academic credentials) a higher priority in the process of 
selecting professors. Traditionally, 
the process for selection of law faculties discloses little if any atten-
tion to teaching’s unique requisite. Great care is taken to test for 
legal acumen by examination of the paper trail, by letters of rec-
ommendation, and by personal interview. Judgments made on 
other qualities, even general personality traits, are superficial.233 
The result of this ivory tower mentality in choosing professors is of-
ten “that by and large law faculty members come to their academic 
positions outstandingly able in their own legal capacities but quite 
lacking in their conception, let alone understanding, of the teaching-
learning process.”234 
Second, law schools should provide support for both internal and 
external pedagogical training of law professors. Within the law 
school, pedagogical skills training should be provided by faculty 
mentors, providing newer faculty members with constructive feed-
 
 232. Morgan, supra note 40, at 381–82. 
 233. Strong, supra note 58, at 226. 
 234. Id. at 227. 
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back and suggestions on improving their skills in Socratic dialogues. 
In addition, law schools should encourage faculty participation in 
teaching conferences that are offered by organizations such as 
American Association of Law Schools (“AALS”), Society of Ameri-
can Law Teachers (“SALT”), and Institute for Law School Teaching 
(“ILST”), which provide both new and old teachers a valuable 
source of ideas, approaches, and teaching techniques.235 Additionally, 
law schools should provide incentives for good teaching as well as 
good scholarship.236 
Third, law schools should foster an open dialogue with students 
regarding the rationale behind the employment of the Socratic 
method. For example, the University of Chicago Law School in-
cludes, as part of the orientation for first-year students, a panel dis-
cussion of the Socratic Method.237 In part, the objective of this dis-
cussion is to explain why many of the professors use the method and 
to discuss students’ fears about class participation and classroom dy-
namics.238 The implementation of such procedural or assimilatory re-
forms will do much to provide Socratic teaching with the new hands 
necessary to mold not only women law students but all who seek le-
gal training. 
D. Substantive Changes: A “New Heart”— Reviving the True Socratic 
Dialogue 
While the “procedural accommodations” suggested above are an 
important step in the right direction, more fundamental changes in 
the substance of Socratic teaching are necessary to tap the full poten-
tial of this teaching method and to humanize its use in law school 
classrooms. In short, Socratic teaching also needs a “new heart.” 
“Beyond requiring some kind of dialogue [between teacher and 
student] . . ., there is not much in common between the Socratic 
Method employed by Socrates and the methods currently employed 
 
 235. See ABA COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, supra note 16, at 43; see 
also INSTITUTE FOR LAW SCHOOL TEACHING, TEACH TO THE WHOLE CLASS: EFFECTIVE 
TEACHING METHODS FOR A DIVERSE STUDENT BODY (1997). 
 236. At some law schools, the only external incentive for honing one’s pedagogical skill is 
the possibility of receiving a best teacher award by vote of the students. Such an incentive, 
though helpful, does not tend to encourage professors the same way that the incentives for 
legal scholarship do. 
 237. See Garrett, supra note 42, at 202. 
 238. See id. 
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by law professors.”239 Others have said it more forcefully: “The term 
‘Socratic’ often is used misleadingly to identify a style of classroom 
teaching in which a professor interrogates students. As actually prac-
ticed in the classroom, however, this method is not Socratic at 
all . . . .”240 In fact, what passes for Socratic dialogue in most law 
school contexts actually resembles more closely the teaching style of 
Socrates’ rival, Protagoras: 
The Protagorean effect was not to help the student gain self-
knowledge (which was Socrates’ goal), but to teach what the 
Greeks considered the skills of rhetoric. Protagoras taught students 
how to develop equally plausible arguments both for and against a 
given proposition by proving and then refuting each conceivable 
position, all in order to be able, as advocates, to “make the weaker 
cause the . . . stronger.” Socrates scorned all of this as the teaching 
of manipulation, rather than analysis and self-knowledge.241 
As discussed below, the legal institution’s adoption of this “mu-
tant” Socratic method—or more accurately, the Protagorean 
method—is lamentable, inasmuch as the true Socratic dialogue is 
more in line with what feminist critics have called for in a teaching 
methodology. 
The Socratic Method should not be a destructive tournament 
where gladiators of unequal power and experience vie to the death. 
Rather, the effort is [or should be] a cooperative one in which the 
teacher and students work to understand an issue more completely. 
The goal is to learn how to analyze legal problems, to reason by 
analogy, to think critically about one’s own arguments and those 
put forth by others, and to understand the effect of the law on 
those subject to it.242 
This section defines the characteristics of the true Socratic method 
and outlines areas in which the “mutant” law school version of the 
Socratic method fails to measure up. 
 
 
 
 239. Rosato, supra note 12, at 40–41. 
 240. Richard K. Neumann, Jr., A Preliminary Inquiry into the Art of Critique, 40 
HASTINGS L.J. 725, 728 (1989). 
 241. Id. at 729 (quoting William C. Heffernan, Not Socrates, But Protagoras: The Sophistic 
Basis of Legal Education, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 399, 415 (1980) (footnotes omitted)). 
 242. Garrett, supra note 42, at 201. 
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1. Characteristics of the true Socratic method 
A true Socratic dialogue has two distinct parts: the elenchus and 
the psychagogia.243 In the elenchus, the teacher uses questions to lead 
the student to a knowledge of his or her own ignorance.244 The elen-
chus is complete when the student realizes his or her ignorance, a 
state known as aporia.245 Finally, in the psychagogia, “(literally, the 
leading of a soul), the questions help the student construct the 
knowledge that the elenchus showed was lacking.”246 
Socrates described his role in the pedagogical “process as that of 
mental midwife, the student being the true parent of his or her own 
knowledge.”247 When speaking with a student, Socrates “treat[ed] 
the student with encouragement, if not affection during the elenchus; 
he congratulate[d] the student at the aporia because he consider[ed] 
the recognition of ignorance to be an achievement; and the student 
usually emerge[d] from the psychagogia with a sense of accomplish-
ment.”248 The positive reinforcement and the sense of encourage-
ment present in a true Socratic dialogue embrace many aspects of 
feminist theory, particularly the ethic of care, which has traditionally 
been lacking in the average Socratic law school classroom. 
Another component of the true Socratic dialogue is the notion of 
“triage.”249 As in the medical context, triage in the Socratic context 
requires the teacher to determine when a full-blown dialogue is nec-
essary. Thus, “[a] dialogue should not even be attempted unless the 
point to be made is a significant one. A misconception is worth an 
elenchus only if it is symptomatic of ineffectual thinking or if the stu-
dent needs to be persuaded of his or her own ignorance.”250 More-
over, when the teacher wants to elicit something that requires only 
minimal thought, he or she can simply state it or elicit it with a lead-
ing question. Otherwise, “a teacher not only wastes time but appears 
to be playing a guessing game . . . .”251 
 
 243. See Neumann, supra note 240, at 730. 
 244. See id. 
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2. Deficiencies of the “mutant” law school Socratic method 
The stereotypical law school dialogue is “elenchus-intense and 
psychagogia-deficient”252 since most law professors have “overdevel-
oped elenchus skills and underdeveloped psychagogia skills.”253 “In 
poorly done [law school] dialogues, a brutal elenchus is the dominat-
ing feature; the teacher treats the aporia as a defeat for the student; 
and the psychagogia is a brief afterthought or happens not at all.”254 
Thus, the “battle” aspect of (so-called) Socratic method, which 
seemed to be a cherished feature among its sado-masochistic advo-
cates, is actually a sign of ineffective Socratic teaching—a result that 
should be shunned rather than exalted. Other deficiencies in the law 
school dialogue include: 
[1] failing to identify the student’s misunderstanding (and to de-
sign the elenchus to expose that misunderstanding to the student); 
[2] breaking off the elenchus before an aporia is reached; [3] failing 
to develop a goal for the psychagogia; [4] asking the ultimate ques-
tion before other questions have caused the student to develop the 
ideas needed to answer the ultimate question; [5] asking similar 
questions repetitiously until both teacher and student are frustrated 
(rather than asking questions that start with what the student 
knows and then building cumulatively toward the teacher’s goal); 
[6] asking open-ended questions to elicit information that both 
teacher and student know the student already knows; and [7] poor 
use of triage (using a dialogue for matters too simple to merit one, 
for example, or explaining matters that need the deeper treatment 
of a dialogue).255 
Recognizing these errors and learning to overcome them is an 
essential element of constructing a humanist-friendly Socratic 
method. As mentioned above, the success of the transformation from 
the traditional law school Socratic dialogue to a true Socratic dia-
logue rests primarily on the skill of the professor. As this section sug-
gests, conducting a true Socratic dialogue requires the development 
of specialized skill and painstaking effort on the part of the teacher. 
Law schools should recognize this and provide encouragement for 
teachers to equip themselves, first, with the knowledge of the objec-
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tives and form of a true Socratic dialogue, and second, with the skills 
necessary to effectively implement such Socratic dialogues in their 
classrooms. 
E. Recognition of the Limits of the Socratic Method 
Through adoption of a more “pure” strain of Socratic teaching, 
the Socratic method can become a more student friendly method of 
pedagogy—especially for women and others who have traditionally 
been disenfranchised by the method. Nevertheless, it is important to 
recognize that the utility of the Socratic method has limits. Even 
those who staunchly advocate the Socratic method also recognize 
the value of employing diverse methodologies.256 This is particularly 
true for classes in the second and third years where either because of 
the subject matter or because of waning student interest, other 
methods may be more appropriate.257 Thus, by confining Socratic 
teaching to those courses (or sections of courses) in which its style is 
compatible with the objectives of the course, Socratic teaching can 
continue to be an effective teaching tool without unnecessarily 
smothering other valid teaching techniques. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Most critics of the Socratic method—even feminist critics—are 
willing to concede that “Socratic exchange can cultivate skills that 
are valuable in certain professional contexts.”258 As such, the Socratic 
method deserves a continued place in legal pedagogy. Nevertheless, 
critics in general and feminist critics in particular have raised valid 
objections to the use of Socratic teaching that need to be addressed. 
Thus, although the Socratic method is not, of necessity, misogynous, 
its law school iteration has historically disfavored female law stu-
dents. The solution, however, is not to scrap the method entirely, 
but rather to transform it to reflect the changing nature of what it 
 
 256. See Rosato, supra note 12, at 61 (“I have made the case for the continued use of the 
Socratic Method, but I do not advocate its exclusive use. . . . The teacher . . . should consider 
using other teaching methods such as lecture, problems, role plays, games, or a less structured 
discussion.”); see also Garrett, supra note 42, at 200 (“My discussion of the Socratic Method 
should not be understood as an argument that it is the only legitimate teaching method in law 
school; on the contrary, I believe professors should adjust their teaching techniques to fit their 
abilities, the nature of the material, time constraints, and other factors.”). 
 257. See Rosato, supra note 12, at 61; Garrett, supra note 42, at 207. 
 258. Rhode, supra note 57, at 1557. 
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means to be a lawyer. With appropriate reforms, the Socratic method 
can continue to be a valuable technique in the pedagogical training 
of lawyers of both genders. 
David D. Garner 
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